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Stargate:1 Malleability as a Threshold
Concept in Legal Education
Melissa H. Weresh

What legal theorists now acknowledge with uneasiness,
first-year law students with terror and confusion,
and lawyers with prosaic calm
is that there may not be a right answer to every legal question.
Two reasonable minds, both analyzing the same set of legal materials,
may differ as to their proper application.2

Teaching students to “think like a lawyer” is the overall objective of legal
education. Thinking like a lawyer—or processing information as a disciplinary
expert—can be defined to include these skills: identifying legal issues and
locating relevant authority; using inductive reasoning to evaluate relevant
authorities; reconciling and synthesizing prior cases; engaging in rulebased and analogical reasoning; identifying relevant policy considerations;
recognizing the malleability of legal principles; identifying and evaluating
ethical and professional considerations in analyzing a client matter;
identifying and evaluating competing arguments and weighing their relative
strength; predicting probable results and making recommendations from
among alternative courses of action; adopting a client-centered approach to
legal reasoning; applying critical reasoning and judgment to evaluate an issue;
critically evaluating the reasoning and rationale for prior determinations.
Thinking like a lawyer requires students to employ the sophisticated and
discipline-specific reasoning process unique to the law-educated; it is an
aspirational attribute of legal education. The skills listed above are individually
complex, and may require the mastery of a number of core concepts. Thinking
like a lawyer also likely requires mastery of certain threshold concepts. These
differ from core concepts insofar as they represent a cognitive shift in the
Melissa H. Weresh is Professor of Law at Drake University Law School.
Editors’ note: Except for article and book titles, British spellings have been changed to American English spellings for
consistency and readability.
1.

In the motion picture, Stargate, while translating the symbols on a cover stone and revealing
a portal to a distant planet, Egyptologist Daniel Jackson acknowledges, “It’s not ‘Door to
Heaven’ . . . it’s . . . Stargate.” Stargate (Metro Goldwyn Mayer 1994)—Quotes, IMDB,
available at http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0111282/quotes.

2.

Linda Ross Meyer, When Reasonable Minds Differ, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1467, 1468 (1996).
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thinking process of one within a discipline.3 I argue that mastering the concept
of malleability of law is such a threshold concept.
Malleability of law is a concept bounded within the discipline, because it
serves as a demarcation of law as a disciplinary area. It is a concept that is
integrative, because, once revealed, it exposes students to interrelated concepts.
Once mastered, the concept is irreversible. Understanding the malleability of
law is troublesome for most students and may seem counterintuitive or alien.
Finally, it is transformative as it occasions a shift in the student’s perception of the
law and how it applies to society. To the extent that malleability encompasses
these unique characteristics of a threshold concept, it represents a “jewel in the
curriculum.”4 Legal educators therefore should focus on making malleability
an explicit learning objective in the first-year curriculum and by coordinating
instruction and assessment of it to marshal students across the threshold. In
this way, threshold concept theory provides a beneficial lens to the ultimate
educational objective of teaching students to think like a lawyer.
In Part I, I trace threshold concepts theory and explore more fully the
characteristics of a threshold concept. I also distinguish between threshold
and core, or key, concepts. Finally, I introduce the reader to liminality, or being
stuck within the threshold. In Part II, I survey the development of threshold
concept theory across disciplines, including an examination of their relatively
limited study in legal education. I then consider malleability as a threshold
concept in legal education and explore the implications of characterizing it
as such.
I. Introduction
Researchers have proposed that threshold concepts exist within disciplines
and that their identification can assist educators in evaluating curricular
outcomes and pedagogies to support student learning.5 The term “threshold
concept” emerged from the Enhancing Teaching Learning Environments in Undergraduate
Courses project.6 This project involved teams of academics from universities in
the United Kingdom and was intended to “develop conceptual frameworks
3.

See Section I(B) and accompanying notes infra.

4.

Glynis Cousin, An Introduction to Threshold Concepts, 17 Planet 4, 5 (2006) (noting that
“[t]hreshold concepts can be used to define potentially powerful transformative points in
the student’s learning experience”) [hereinafter Cousin, Introduction].

5.

See generally Noel Entwistle, Threshold Concepts and Transformative Ways of Thinking
within Research into Higher Education, in Threshold Concepts Within the Disciplines 21,
21–35 (Ray Land, Jan H.F. Meyer & Jan Smith eds., Sense Pub. 2008).

6.

See Ray Land, Glynis Cousin, Jan H. F. Meyer & Peter Davies, Threshold Concepts and
Troublesome Knowledge: Implications for Course Design and Evaluation in Improving
Student Learning: Diversity and Inclusivity 53, 54 (Chris Rust ed., Oxford Centre for Staff
& Learning Development 2005) (noting that threshold concepts “have attracted particular
interest from economics communities in the UK . . . and Australia”) [hereinafter Land et al.,
Implications].
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directed at the quality of learning achieved in higher education institutions.”7
Threshold concepts within a discipline can be “considered akin to passing
through a portal, or conceptual gateway, thus opening up a new and previously
inaccessible way of thinking about something.”8 “Such concepts lead to a
transformed way of understanding, or viewing something that may represent
how people ‘think’ in a particular discipline, or how they perceive, apprehend
or experience particular phenomena within a discipline.”9 Understanding a
threshold concept helps a student move from a lay to disciplinary manner
of constructing knowledge. According to Meyer and Land, the principal
developers of theory on them, threshold concepts “bind a subject together,
being fundamental to ways of thinking and practicing in that discipline.”10
Threshold concepts differ from those that are core or foundational primarily
in their transformative quality. Core concepts “build layers upon the learning
foundations already possessed.”11 Threshold concepts, in contrast, possess
additional, distinctive characteristics. They have been defined to be bounded,
integrative, irreversible, troublesome, and transformative.12 From a practical
perspective, they “represent ‘potential blockages in the path of growing
understanding,’ or the bits of the course where students ‘get stuck.’”13 “When
mastered, [threshold concepts] are what enable students to look at problems in
completely new ways and to ‘think, practice and talk’ in the manner of scholars
of a particular discipline.”14
Because a threshold concept may be transformative, irreversible, and
troublesome, mastering it can shift in the learner’s identity.15 As a result,
some students may become stuck within the threshold, in a state referred
to as “liminality.”16 There are two difficulties associated with this state: the
7.

Sarah Barradell, The Identification of Threshold Concepts: A Review of Theoretical
Complexities and Methodological Challenges, 65 Higher Educ. 265–66 (Feb. 2013) (on file
with author).

8.

Jan H. F. Meyer & Ray Land, Threshold Concepts and Troublesome Knowledge: Linkages
to Ways of Thinking and Practising Within the Disciplines, in Improving Student Learning:
Ten Years On 1 (Chris Rust ed., Oxford Centre for Staff & Learning Development, 2003)
[hereinafter Meyer & Land, Linkages].

9.

Peter Davies & Jean Mangan, Recognising Threshold Concepts: An Exploration of Different
Approaches 2 (unpublished paper) (copy on file with author).

10.

Land et al., Implications, supra note 6, at 54.

11.

Barradell, supra note 7, at 266.

12.

See generally Overcoming Barriers to Student Understanding: Threshold Concepts and
Troublesome Knowledge (Jan H. F. Meyer & Ray Land, eds., Routeledge 2006) [hereinafter
Overcoming Barriers].

13.

Guy Walker, A Cognitive Approach to Threshold Concepts, 65 Higher Educ. 247(Feb. 2013)
(copy on file with author).

14.

Id.

15.

See Land et al., Implications, supra note 6, at 55.

16.

See id. In an earlier work, Meyer and Land “develop the argument that acquiring a threshold
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student may become frustrated and give up;17 or some students develop “a
partial, limited or superficial understanding of the concept to be learned
which [researchers] have characterized as a form of ‘mimicry.’”18 A focus on
the distinct characteristics of a threshold concept and how these contribute
to students getting stuck, may help inform instruction that enables them to
cross the threshold and to begin to analyze material in a disciplinary-specific
manner.
A. Characteristics of Threshold Concepts
Since the introduction of the theory of threshold concepts, researchers have
identified an array of their probable, likely, or essential19 characteristics. They
have been described as likely bounded20 within a discipline. Meyer and Land
concept may be likened in some disciplines to a ‘rite of passage.’” See Jan H. F. Meyer
& Ray Land, Threshold Concepts and Troublesome Knowledge: Issues of Liminality,
in Overcoming Barriers, supra note 12, at 19, 22 [hereinafter Meyer et al., Liminality].
Discussing the changes experienced after the liminal state, the authors note “[t]his point
raises some interesting thoughts about what it means, for example, when a student for the
first time becomes conscious . . . that they are, or are beginning to think like, an accountant,
chemist, economist, historian, lawyer, mathematician, physicist, statistician, and so on.” Id.
at 23 (emphasis in original).
17.

See Land et al., Implications, supra note 6, at 55.

18.

Id. The authors explain: “[w]e might speculate that a student in a ‘stuck place,’ having
glimpsed the outline of a threshold portal and perhaps only vaguely aware of what lies
beyond it, but conscious of the failure to cross it, may engage in two forms of mimicry.”
Meyer et al., Liminality, supra note 16, at 24. “Compensatory mimicry” is described “as
assuage of self that something is understood—witness the novice student who rehearses what
is known (but irrelevant) in learning for examinations, rather than what is required to be
known for them.” Id. The second form of mimicry is “conscious mimicry, when a student is
aware that what is required is beyond grasp . . .” Id.

19.

Barradell, supra note 7, at 266.
It is worth noting that at the time of these early writings on threshold concepts,
the term itself was still evolving. The intention was ‘to open up discussion of
threshold concepts as an important but problematic factor in the design of effective
learning environments within disciplines’. Recently, Land formally spoke of seven
characteristics—adding discursive and reconstitutive. Others have added their own
ideas including threshold capabilities, and function, experiences and practice. It is
clear that threshold concepts have generated a great deal of scholarly interest and
judging by the wealth of literature that now exists, the idea has resonated with many
academics in a range of disciplines. However, this ready acceptance of something that
still is emerging has meant that aspects of the discussion around threshold concepts
have not necessarily been undertaken with the rigour they perhaps should, and that
a number of important questions remain unanswered. For example, how many of the
five characteristics should a concept possess to be regarded as a threshold concept?
Are some characteristics more important than others? If a concept is troublesome and
integrative but not transformative, is it still a threshold concept?
Id. (citations omitted).

20.

Meyer & Land, Linkages, supra note 8, at 6 (noting that threshold concepts are “[p]ossibly
often (though not necessarily always) bounded”).

Stargate: Malleability as a Threshold Concept in Legal Education

693

explain that they are bounded in a manner that “that any conceptual space
will have terminal frontiers, bordering with thresholds into new conceptual
areas.”21 This characteristic also shows in the extent that a threshold concept
informs expert understanding within a discipline; each threshold concept
“does not generally explain the whole of the discipline, only a specific subdomain, or related aspects.”22 Moreover, this characteristic informs the limit
of a concept’s applicability to other disciplinary boundaries: “It might be that
such boundedness in certain instances serves to constitute the demarcation
between disciplinary areas, to define academic territories.”23
Threshold concepts also tend to be integrative, revealing relationships
between concepts once viewed as distinct. Meyer and Land explain that
threshold concepts “expos[e] the previously hidden interrelatedness of
something.”24 Mastery of a threshold concept may enable a student “to make
connections that were hitherto hidden from view.”25 The integrative quality
helps students begin to process information in a disciplinary-specific manner.26
21.

Id.

22.

Caroline Baillie, John A. Bowden & Jan H. F. Meyer, Threshold Capabilities: Threshold
Concepts and Knowledge Capability Linked Through Variation Theory, 65 Higher Educ.
229 (Feb. 2013) [hereinafter Baillie et al., Knowledge Capability] (copy on file with author).

23.

Meyer & Land, Linkages, supra note 8, at 6. The authors explain:
Within the field of Cultural Studies a threshold concept that has to be understood
early is the breakdown of the barrier between high and popular culture. This is
fundamental to the Cultural Studies approach. This is a significant departure from
practice in English Literature where that concept not only doesn’t really exist but if it
did (i.e. if you crossed that threshold) it would undermine the discipline of Eng. Lit.
itself.
Id. (citations omitted).

24.

Jan H. F. Meyer & Ray Land, Threshold Concepts and Troublesome Knowledge (2):
Epistemological Considerations and a Conceptual Framework for Teaching and Learning,
49 Higher Educ. 373 (2005) [hereinafter Meyer & Land, Epistemological Considerations].
Other experts explain the integrative quality: “[P]reviously occluded relationships between
former disparately perceived aspects of the subject landscape are revealed. This revelation
may be protracted or sudden in the sense of something ‘clicking together.’” Baillie et al.,
Knowledge Capability, supra note 22, at 229.

25.

Cousin, Introduction, supra note 4, at 4.

26.

As Peter Davies and Jean Mangan explain:
Thus we are not looking for a set of isolated “magic concepts” but for a web of concepts
that stand in a particular relationship to each other, arising partly from the historical
development of thinking in a subject. Where successive developments in a subject
incorporate previous thinking, a tightly structured set of discipline understanding
develops. When successive developments in a subject stand largely in opposition
to each other the relationships between ways of thinking in the subject becomes
looser. However, in both cases a learner who grasps the significance of a theoretical
development in the subject attains a new perspective on other aspects of the discipline.
Davies & Mangan, supra note 9, at 6.
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These concepts are “[p]robably irreversible, in that the change of perspective
occasioned by acquisition of a threshold concept is unlikely to be forgotten,
or will be unlearned only by considerable effort.”27 This does not mean that
mastery of one cannot be enhanced. In fact, irreversibility “does not exclude
subsequent modification or rejection of the concept for a more refined or rival
understanding.” However, once learned, threshold concepts may be difficult
to reject. This may be due, in part, to their integrative quality. “If a concept
integrates a spectrum of prior understanding it is more likely to be irreversible
because, once acquired, it holds together a learner’s thinking about many
different phenomena.”28
Threshold concepts also have been described as troublesome; they are
“challenging, difficult to come to terms with, counter-intuitive or requiring
a suspension of disbelief.”29 They may be conceptually challenging because
understanding them requires learners to understand and communicate
within a new discourse community.30 “Specific discourses have developed
within disciplines to represent (and simultaneously privilege) particular
understandings and ways of seeing and thinking. Such discourses distinguish
individual communities of practice and are necessarily less familiar to new
entrants to such discursive communities or participants who are peripheral to
them.”31 These concepts also may seem alien or counter-intuitive to students.32
“From this view, mastery of a threshold concept can be inhibited by the
prevalence of a ‘common sense’ or intuitive understanding of it.”33 These
concepts may be sufficiently troublesome so as to require the learner to reject
previously held knowledge, causing emotional challenge. They “demand an
27.

Meyer & Land, Linkages, supra note 8, at 5 (emphasis in original). Cousin notes, “[f]or
teachers this can produce a low ability to empathize with student[s] who have yet to gain
mastery. They cannot get back to ‘innocence’ so to speak.” Glynis Cousin, Threshold
Concepts, Troublesome Knowledge, and Emotional Capital: An exploration into learning
about others, in Overcoming Barriers, supra note 12, at 134,136 [hereinafter Cousin, Emotional
Capital].

28.

Davies & Mangan, supra note 9, at 2

29.

Baillie et al., Knowledge Capability, supra note 22, at 229.

30.

Meyer & Land, Linkages, supra note 8, at 11 (noting that the “discursive practices of a given
community may render previously ‘familiar’ concepts strange and subsequently conceptually
difficult”).

31.

Land et al., Implications, supra note 6, at 55. “It is hard to imagine any shift in perspective
that is not simultaneously accompanied by (or occasioned through) an extension of the
student’s use of language. Through this elaboration of discourse new thinking is brought
into being, expressed, reflected upon and communicated.” Meyer & Land, Epistemological
Considerations, supra note 24, at 374. Baillie et al. further explain, “[D]iscourses have
developed within disciplines to represent ‘ways of seeing and knowing’—but these can be
troublesome for the newcomer especially if the words have alternative, everyday, but varying
interpretations.” Baillie et al., Knowledge Capability, supra note 22, at 244.

32.

Meyer & Land, Linkages, supra note 8, at 2 (noting that troublesome knowledge “is
knowledge that is ‘alien’, or counter-intuitive or even intellectually absurd at face value”).

33.

Cousin, Introduction, supra note 4, at 4.
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integration of ideas and this requires the student to accept a transformation
of their own understanding.”34 “This transfiguration and extension of the
subjectivity of the learner might be exhilarating but might incur a sense of
disquietude or even loss on the part of the learner as they let go the security of
a previously held conceptual stance to enter less certain terrain.”35
Finally, there is an inherently transformative characteristic of a threshold
concept. In fact, while researchers do not agree that all of the above
characteristics exist for each threshold concept,36 there is general agreement
regarding their transformative quality. “The essential property of a threshold
concept is its transformative character; one that occasions in varying degrees
(attributable to individual differences) epistemic and ontological shifts in
the learner.”37 The transformative quality can also represent a reconstitution,
or “a shift in learner subjectivity, a transconfiguration of self, of identity; an
ontological shift.”38
The characteristics of a threshold concept are related to one another.39 Their
bounded and troublesome aspects may be related to their integrative and
transformative qualities. Integration, transformation and irreversibility can be
viewed as “necessarily interwoven.”40
[A] threshold concept helps delimit the boundaries of a subject because it
integrates a particular set of concepts, beliefs and theories. The stronger the
integration, the sharper the boundaries of a subject will appear . . . . The looser
the integration, the more the boundaries of a subject become open to debate.
The more transformative a concept, the more likely it is to be troublesome
because it requires reconfiguration of previously acquired understanding.
A concept that integrates prior understanding is necessarily transformative
because it changes a learner’s perception of their existing understanding. If
a concept integrates a spectrum of prior understanding it is more likely to
be irreversible because, once acquired, it holds together a learner’s thinking
34.

Land et al., Implications, supra note 6, at 54. Cousin further explains, “Getting students to
reverse their intuitive understandings is also troublesome because the reversal can involve an
uncomfortable, emotional repositioning.” Cousin, Introduction, supra note 4, at 4.

35.

Land et al., Implications, supra note 6, at 58.

36.

See Barradell, supra note 7, at 266–67.

37.

Baillie et al., Knowledge Capability, supra note 22, at 229.

38.

Id. See also Cousin, Emotional Capital, supra note 27, at 135 (noting that “[n]ew understandings
are assimilated into the learner’s biography, becoming part of what he knows, who he is and
how he feels”).

39.

See, e.g., Jan H. F. Meyer & Ray Land, Editors’ Preface to Overcoming Barriers, supra note 12,
at xiv, xv. Meyer and Land explain that a “threshold concept represents a transformed way
of understanding, or interpreting, or viewing something . . . . However, such transformation,
though necessary for progress within a subject, may prove troublesome to certain learners
for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that such transformation entails a letting go
of earlier, comfortable positions . . . .” Id.

40.

Davies & Mangan, supra note 9, at 2.
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about many different phenomena. To abandon such a threshold concept
would be massively disruptive to an individual’s whole way of thinking.41

B. Threshold Versus Core and Key Concepts
Threshold concepts differ from core, or key concepts. In fact, leading
threshold concept expert Jan “Meyer’s notion of a threshold concept was
introduced . . . as a particular basis for differentiating between core learning
outcomes that represent ‘seeing things in a new way’ and those that do not.
A threshold concept is thus seen as something distinct within what university
teachers would typically describe as ‘core concepts.’”42
Threshold concepts possess distinguishing characteristics. They are
bounded, integrative, irreversible, troublesome, and transformative. On the
other hand, core concepts “are the building blocks, fundamental for building
a discourse of syllabus or syllabus.”43 As building blocks, they “can only be
put in position once other necessary layers of understanding have been laid
down. This perception leads to an emphasis on the role of . . . key concepts in
determining the overall shape and structure of understanding.”44 Key concepts
“open up the ‘portal’, but not in the sense that the term is often used in some
educational contexts, as interchangeable with ‘core’ concepts . . . .”45 “A key is
not the foundation that a building is constructed upon; it is what you use to
open the door.”46
In contrast, becoming a member of a discourse community who
processes information in a disciplinary-specific manner47 “requires more
than understanding these ideas.”48 Threshold concepts represent conceptual
41.

Id.

42.

Meyer & Land, Linkages, supra note 8, at 1.

43.

Anna-Karin Carstensen & Jonte Bernhard, Threshold Concepts and Keys to the Portal of
Understanding: Some Examples from Electrical Engineering, in Threshold Concepts within
the Disciplines 143, 153 (Ray Land, Jan H. F. Meyer & Jan Smith, ed., Sense Pub. 2008).
Noel Entwistle explains that “basic concepts that help students initially to see the subject in
a different way are not integrative and so not threshold concepts as such, although they can
act as transformative thresholds for individual students.” Entwistle, supra note 5, at 21, 32.

44.

Davies & Mangan, supra note 9, at 3 (explaining that “[b]y implication, one concept is
more advanced than another because it requires more layers or prior understanding”).
Meyer and Land note that a “core concept is a conceptual ‘building block’ that progresses
understanding of the subject; it has to be understood but it does not necessarily lead to a
qualitatively different view of subject matter.” Meyer & Land, Linkages, supra note 8, at 4.

45.

Carstensen & Bernhard, supra note 43, at 143.

46.

Id. at 153. The authors explain that “we use the term as a more precise metaphor to mean
that the concept in question acts like a key to open up the ‘portal’ of understanding.” Id. at 143
(emphasis in original).

47.

Davies & Mangan, supra note 9, at 4 (referring to this as “acquiring the ‘way of thinking and
practice’ in a subject”) (citations omitted).

48.

Id.

Stargate: Malleability as a Threshold Concept in Legal Education

697

change,49 and “help the learner to employ newly acquired discipline concepts
in making sense of each new set of phenomena they encounter.”50
[C]onceptual change may also operate at a more profound level through the
acquisition or organizing schemas of thought that may be associated with the
development of disciplinary thought . . . . New developments within subjects
change the way that members of academic communities think about other
ideas that have been developed within the discipline . . . . However, in other
cases old ideas are re-worked and subsumed within new theories. In these
cases the acquisition of a new concept is transformative insofar as it integrates
and reworks other disciplinary ideas that the learner has previously acquired
. . . .51

C. Liminality
Because threshold concepts are troublesome and transformative,
they represent areas in the curriculum where students struggle. Because
“transformation . . . can . . . entail a shift in the learner’s identity . . . [some]
students [can] remain stuck in an ‘in-between’ state in which they oscillate
between earlier, less sophisticated understandings, and the fuller appreciation
of a concept that their tutors require from them.”52 This has been referred to
as a state of liminality,53 “a suspended state of partial understanding, or ‘stuck
place’, in which understanding approximates to a kind of ‘mimicry’ or lack of
authenticity.”54
49.

Id. at 3–5.

50.

Id. at 4. The authors explain that when “a concept is used to make sense of novel situations . . .
we may talk of it being transformative.” Id. “Transformation occurs when a student finally
grasps a key concept within the discipline’s view of the world and . . . experiences a change
of world view themselves.” Aidan Ricketts, Threshold Concepts: ‘Loaded’ Knowledge or
Critical Education, in Threshold Concepts and Transformational Learning 45, 45 (Jan H. F.
Meyer, Ray Land & Caroline Baillie, eds., Sense Pub. 2010) [hereinafter Ricketts, Loaded
Knowledge]. Ricketts cautions, however, that ‘[t]ransformative experiences may enhance a
student’s critical awareness, but this should not be assumed; in some cases the nature of the
transformation may actually reduce the scope for critical thinking.” Id.

51.

Id.

52.

Land, Implications, supra note 6, at 55.

53.

“This in-between state we have termed a state of ‘liminality’, from the Latin meaning ‘within
the threshold’.” Id.

54.

Ray Land, Jan H. F. Meyer & Caroline Baillie, Editors’ Preface to Threshold Concepts and
Transformational Learning ix, x (Ray Land, Jan H. F. Meyer & Caroline Baillie, eds., Sense
Pub. 2010) [hereinafter Land et al., Preface]. The authors further explain:
Insights gained by learners as they cross thresholds can be exhilarating but might
also be unsettling, requiring an uncomfortable shift in identity, or, paradoxically, a
sense of loss. A further complication might be the operation of an “underlying game”
which requires the learner to comprehend the often tacit games of enquiry or ways of
thinking and practising inherent within specific disciplinary discourses.
Id.
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The state of liminality is “within the threshold,”55 and signifies an attempt
to engage with the material.56 However, some students get stuck within the
threshold, and may “present a partial, limited or superficial understanding of
the concept to be learned which [is] characterized as a form of ‘mimicry.’”57
Progression between the pre-liminal, liminal, and post-liminal state is not
necessarily linear. “[T]he acquisition of threshold concepts often involves
a degree of recursiveness, and of oscillation.”58 However, because “mastery
of a threshold concept often involves messy journeys back, forth and across
conceptual terrain,”59 students may “become frustrated, lose confidence
and give up.”60 By identifying troublesome and transformative points in
the curriculum and those where students get stuck, educators can structure
learning to help move students through the liminal state.61
D. The Relational View of Threshold Concepts Features
While the characteristics of threshold concepts discussed above have been
broadly considered, particularly with regard to whether each is essential, the
five foregoing remain relatively unchallenged. Moreover, in their most recent
compilation of papers, Threshold Concepts and Transformational Learning,62 Meyer
and Land were “emboldened to see the consolidation of the characteristics
of threshold concepts, and of learning thresholds more generally.”63 Their
chart below64 demonstrates the relationship between the concepts and the
progression through the liminal state.
55.

Land, Implications, supra note 6, at 55.

56.

“[O]nce a learner enters this liminal space, she is engaged with the project of mastery unlike
the learner who remains in a state of pre-liminality in which understandings are at best
vague.” Cousin, Emotional Capital, supra note 27, at 139.

57.

Land et al., Implications, supra note 6, at 55. However, that mimicry is not simply a superficial
understanding or modeling. Rather, it “seems to involve both attempts at understanding
and troubled misunderstanding, or limited understanding, and is not merely intention to
reproduce information in a given form.” Meyer & Land, Epistemological Considerations,
supra note 24, at 377.

58.

Land et al., Preface, supra note 54, at xi.

59.

Cousin, Introduction, supra note 4, at 5.

60.

Land et al., Implications, supra note 6, at 55.

61.

So, for example, Meyer and Land argue that an identification of threshold concepts should
inform instructors in several ways. The identification of threshold concepts should: 1)
influence the sequence of material within a program of instruction; 2) identify “the processes
through which learners are made ready for, approach, recognize, and internalize threshold
concepts; and 3) illuminate “the ways in which learners and teachers recognise when
threshold concepts have been internalized.” Land et al., Implications, supra note 6, at 56–57.

62.

Threshold Concepts and Transformational Learning (Ray Land, Jan H.F. Meyer &
Caroline Baillie eds., Sense Pub. 2010).

63.

Land et al., Preface, supra note 54, at xi.

64.

Id. at xii (the chart appears in the preface of Threshold Concepts and Transformational
Learning—and can be verified here: https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/1177-threshold-
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The progression begins with a student encountering troublesome knowledge.65
“The troublesome knowledge inherent within the threshold concept serves
here as an instigative or provocative feature that unsettles prior understanding
rendering it fluid, and provoking a state of liminality.”66 When a student enters
the liminal state an integration of information begins to occur. This integration
“requires a reconfiguring of the learner’s prior conceptual schema and a letting
go or discarding of any conceptual stance.”67 This reconfiguration is viewed as
reconstitutive.68 Finally, in the post-liminal state, the student is transformed
in a way that is irreversible.69 “These latter effects—the crossing of conceptual
boundaries, transformation, irreversibility and changed discourse—can be
characterized as consequential features of the threshold concept.”70 It should
be stressed, however, that this relational view does not have an “overly rigid
concepts-and-transformational-learning.pdf).
65.

See id. (noting that “the journey towards the acquisition of a threshold concept is seen to be
initiated by an encounter with a form of troublesome knowledge in the preliminal state”).

66.

Id. (emphasis in original).

67.

Id. (emphasizing that “[t]his reconfiguration occasions an ontological and epistemic shift”).

68.

See id. (“[t]he integration/reconfiguration and accompanying ontological/epistemic shift can
be seen as reconstitutive features of the threshold concept. Together these features bring
about the required new understanding”).

69.

See id. (“As a consequence of this new understanding the learner crosses a conceptual
boundary into a new conceptual space and enters a post-liminal state in which both learning
and the learner are changed.”).

70.

Id.
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sequential nature,” and that the “acquisition of threshold concepts often
involves a degree of recursiveness.”71
II. Threshold Concepts in the Disciplines
Economics educators in the United Kingdom who participated in a joint
project of the Economic and Social Research Council72 and the Teaching and
Learning Research Programme73 first introduced the notion of a threshold
concept in 2003.74 Many disciplines since have come together to identify widely
accepted threshold concepts. An examination of a few of these helps provide
a backdrop to the complexity of the concepts within the disciplines and to
illustrate how they represent transformative, disciplinary ways of thinking.
One of the first and often cited threshold concepts to be explored by
researchers was opportunity cost in economics.75 “Fundamental to the
discipline of economics is the issue of choice: choosing between scarce
resources or alternatives. Economists are interested in how individuals, groups,
organizations, and societies make choices, particularly when faced with the
reality that resources and alternatives are limited.”76 Opportunity cost was
defined as “‘the evaluation placed on the most highly valued of the rejected
alternatives or opportunities.’”77
71.

Id. (further noting that “running throughout this transformational process, in what we might
call the ‘subliminal’ mode, there is often an ‘underlying game’ in which ways of thinking
and practicing that are often left tacit come to be recognized, grappled with and gradually
understood”).

72.

The Economic and Social Research Council is “the UK’s largest organization for funding
research on economic and social issues.” About us, Economic and Social Research Council
(2013), available at http://www.esrc.ac.uk/about-esrc/.

73.

“The Teaching and Learning Research Programme had six distinct aims [that were] related
to performing and promoting excellent educational research and ensuring that it was
used to enhance learning.” TLRP: AIMS—Outcomes, Teaching and Learning Research
Programme, available at http://www.tlrp.org/aims/index.html. The six aims included 1)
Learning; 2) Outcomes; 3) Lifecourse; 4) Enrichment; 5) Expertise; and 6) Improvement. Id.

74.

Meyer & Land, Linkages, supra note 8, at 1:
This paper arises from ongoing research undertaken by the Economics team of the
ESRC/ TLRP Project ‘Enhancing Teaching and Learning Environments’ (ETL). This
forms part of the large scale ESRC Teaching and Learning Research Programme Phase
2. ETL is seeking to identify factors leading to high quality learning environments
within five disciplinary contexts across a range of HE institutions. Meyer’s notion
of a threshold concept was introduced into project discussions on learning outcomes as
a particular basis for differentiating between core learning outcomes that represent
“seeing things in a new way” and those that do not.
Id.

75.

Id. at 3 (citations omitted).

76.

Id. at 4 (citations omitted).

77.

Id. (citations omitted).
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Thus opportunity cost captures the idea that choices can be compared, and
that every choice (including not choosing) means rejecting alternatives. A
student who has a good grasp of this concept has moved a long way toward
breaking out of a framework of thinking that sees choices as predetermined,
or unchangeable. They have also moved toward seeing “two sides” of every
choice, and in looking beyond immediate consequences, and even just
monetary “costs” towards a more abstract way of thinking.78

Because opportunity cost is both “‘influenced by prior choices that have been
made, but with respect to this choice itself, [] is [also] choice-influencing rather
than choice-influenced,’” once the concept is understood and “‘accepted’ by the
individual student as a valid way of interpreting the world, it fundamentally
changes their way of thinking about their own choices, as well as serving as a tool to interpret the
choices made by others.”79
Educators in mathematics have also arrived at a degree of consensus on
threshold concepts. “In pure mathematics the concept of a limit is a threshold
concept; it is the gateway to mathematical analysis and constitutes a fundamental
basis for understanding some of the foundations and application of other
branches of mathematics such as differential and integral calculus.”80 This
illustrates how an understanding of the concept of limits is integrative and
transformative.
Since the introduction of threshold concepts in 2003, many disciplines
have endeavored to identify these notions. Published in 2008, Threshold Concepts
within the Disciplines81 is a compilation of papers from a variety of disciplinaryspecific inquiries into threshold concepts. Chapters include an examination of

78.

Id. (citations omitted).

79.

Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

80.

Id. at 3. Mathematicians may have identified some of the characteristics of threshold concepts
prior to the theory being fully articulated by Land and Meyer.
That mathematicians themselves are aware of issues that surround threshold concepts
is evident from the work of Artigue who refers to ‘a theory of epistemological obstacles’
and, by way of summary, gives as a first example of such obstacles: “…the everyday
meaning of the word ‘limit,’ which induces resistant conceptions of the limit as a
barrier or as the last term of a process, or tends to restrict convergence to monotonic
convergence….” The idea is then developed by way of more complex examples that,
as forms of knowledge, ‘epistemological obstacles’ constitute ‘resistant difficulties’ for
students.
Id. (citations omitted).

81.

Entwistle, supra note 5, at 21–35.
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threshold concepts in computer science,82 electrical engineering,83 biology,84 and
grammar,85 among others. These examples, while undoubtedly challenging for
non-disciplinary experts, are included here to illustrate how other disciplines
have identified concepts that are troublesome to student understanding, but
also crucial to disciplinary learning.
A. Exploration of Threshold Concepts in Legal Education
Examination of threshold concepts within legal education has been more
limited. As recently as 2008, in an issue of Directions, a newsletter of the UK
Center for Legal Education, Julien Webb noted that “[s]o far, I am not aware
of any published work examining legal threshold concepts in any depth, but
I suggest, intuitively, that some potential examples of the latter could include
constructs such as analogy, materiality, responsibility, allocation of risk, and
82.

In the chapter, “Threshold Concepts in Computer Science: A Multi-National Empirical
Investigation,” researchers explored the concept of “object-oriented programming” as
a threshold concept. Carol Zander et al., Threshold Concepts in Computer Science: A
Multi-National Empirical Investigation, in Threshold Concepts within the Disciplines,
105, 110–11 (Ray Land, Jan H. F. Meyer & Jan Smith, eds., Sense Pub. 2008). With regard
to object-oriented programming, the authors note, “[i]deally, the graduates of computer
science programmes should be able to produce high quality software that is correct, efficient,
reusable, extensible, and easy to use. Object-oriented programming languages support
these goals . . . .” Because learning object-oriented programming is troublesome, integrative,
irreversible, and transformative, the authors conclude it is a threshold concept. Id. at 110–12.

83.

See, e.g., Carstensen & Bernhard, supra note 43, at 143–54. Authors Carstensen and Bernhard
considered troublesome concepts in the learning of electrical circuits and control
theory, such as frequency response . . . [T]hey found that certain concepts, such as the
Bode Plot in circuitry, can function like a specialist ‘key’ that opens up the disciplinary
portal of understanding. Moreover, teaching a ‘key’ concept . . . does not just open up
that particular concept, but also the learning of other concepts related to it.
Land et al., Preface, supra note 54, at xv (emphasis in original).

84.

See Charlotte Taylor, Threshold Concepts, Troublesome Knowledge and Ways of Thinking
and Practising—Can We Tell the Difference in Biology?, in Threshold Concepts within
the Disciplines 185, 185 (Ray Land, Jan H. F. Meyer & Jan Smith, eds., Sense Pub. 2008)
Author Charlotte Taylor interviewed biology teachers and graduates and noted that the
interviews “provide clear evidence of the complexity of the discipline of biology, and build a
distinct picture of key areas of troublesome knowledge and potential thresholds.” Id. at 193.
There was consensus on “a number of areas of biology which possessed the characteristics
of threshold concepts, and most of these areas dealt with the complexity, dynamics and
variability of biological systems.” Id.

85.

See Marina Orsini-Jones, Troublesome Language Knowledge: Identifying Threshold
Concepts in Grammar Learning, in Threshold Concepts within the Disciplines 213 (Ray
Land, Jan H. F. Meyer & Jan Smith, eds., Sense Pub. 2008). Author Marina Orsini-Jones
notes that “individual grammar components—morphemes, words, clauses, phrases—
. . . [are each] self-standing threshold concept[s], which, once mastered, open[] up a new
door into the next one.” Id. at 219. Alternatively, “it could be argued that the rank scale concept
underpinning functional grammar is the overarching threshold concept . . . and that is in
turn composed of what could be defined as the rank scale threshold concept’s components, each of
which needed to be crossed in order to grasp the overarching concept.” Id. (emphasis in
original).
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the like.”86 In addition, there are a few international scholars who posit that
legal reasoning, or thinking like a lawyer, is a threshold concept.
A group of law and physics educators in Australia convened to identify
threshold concepts within their respective disciplines.87 The Akerlind et al.
group was
initially drawn to the overall concept of uncertainty as a threshold concept.
That is, that new students in both these disciplines often assume there is one
correct answer, and that a key goal of a university education in law or physics,
particularly in the first year, is to make students comfortable with conceptual
‘greyness’—the notion of uncertainty, and hence complexity.88
In addition, the law group considered “other possible concepts such as
the rule of law, and the notion of precedent.” However, “[a]s discussions
progressed . . . the key threshold objective in the learning of law was identified
as being able ‘to think like a lawyer.’”89 The group defined this concept to
86.

Julian Webb, Threshold Concepts: A New Tool for Learning Law? (Directions Autumn
2008) at UKCLE, UK Centre for Legal Education, July, 9, 2010, available at http://www.
ukcle.ac.uk/resources/directions/previous/issue17/threshold/ [hereinafter Webb, New
Tool]. Webb notes that the cited examples are “most cases, quite big, relatively abstract
(but also highly practical) concepts.” Id. He further highlights the value of trying to identify
threshold concepts, noting that “we can certainly begin to see how a stronger focus on such
concepts could open up some very different ways of organizing and conceptualizing the
undergraduate curriculum, particularly in the first year, when so much of our students’ way
of knowing and learning becomes established.” Id. In later research, Webb suggests values as
a threshold concept in legal education. See Julian Webb, Dealing (with) uncertainty—Values
as ‘threshold concepts’ in legal education, Slidefinder, April 23, 2009, available at http://
www.slidefinder.net/d/dealing_uncertainty_values_threshold_concepts/32270285. Within
doctrinal areas there may be other threshold concepts, or portals, necessary to being able to
think like a lawyer.
Examples could include the duality of control and obligation that persists in the law
of trusts (legal and beneficial ownership, fiduciary duties), the rather bizarre metaphor
of the business corporation as a type of legal person, or the almost self-contradictory
duplicity of English constitutionalism (the monarch has powers that the monarch
never uses). These ideas are certainly not forgotten; they are in fact internalized,
rendered normal, natural and largely unquestioned for the legal thinker and, as
already observed, can even become the very form of abstraction upon which we quietly
boast the intellectual integrity of our discipline. To the neophyte, however, they can be
bizarre and counter-intuitive, if not just plain repugnant.
Aiden Ricketts, Threshold Concepts in Legal Education, 26 Directions: J. Educ. Studies 2,
6 (2006) (noting that “[a]s previously transformed legal thinkers we can so easily forget just
how counter-intuitive established common law ideas actually are”) [hereinafter Ricketts,
Legal Education].

87.

See Gerlese Akerlind et al., A Threshold Concepts Focus to First Year Law Curriculum
Design: Supporting Student Learning Using Variation Theory, presented for an Australian
Learning and Teaching Council (ALTC) funded curriculum renewal project, available at
http://www.fyhe.com.au/past_papers/papers10/content/pdf/12B.pdf (copy on file with
author) [hereinafter Akerlind et al., Threshold Concepts Focus].

88.

Id. at 2.

89.

Id.
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include “an understanding of uncertainty, that there is not necessarily a quick
or simple or one right answer.”90 However, it extended the term “more broadly
to accepting different ways of arguing and different possibilities for analysis
of the facts and problem at hand.”91 The group concluded that “the central
threshold concept for law, the most important threshold concept for the first
year of legal education, was legal reasoning.”92

Similarly, Aiden Ricketts, a professor at the University of the South Pacific,
identified “thinking like a lawyer” as a threshold concept of legal education.93
Without specifically defining the term, Ricketts observed that
Law is famous for its specialized language (jargon) and for the peculiar forms
of reasoning (legal reasoning) that are routinely employed. . . . A term often
used by legal educators that aptly describes the transformations required of
aspiring law students is that of training students to “think like a lawyer.”94

As for the threshold concepts characteristics, Ricketts notes that “[t]he very
idea of teaching students to think like a lawyer invokes the idea that students
need to transform their thought processes, and it is strongly suggestive of
a counter-intuitive form of discourse that is central to the discipline’s self
image.”95 Moreover, “‘legal’ forms of thinking and analysis become not only
essential tools of practice, but key and often exalted aspects of professional
identity for the trained (and transformed) legal thinker.”96 Finally, “[i]t can be
difficult for experienced legal scholars to appreciate and even remember how
counter-intuitive much of the discipline is, as they have long since internalized
their own excursion through the thresholds.”97
Ricketts also proposed two related critical thinking skills as threshold
concepts in legal education, assuming that one of its objectives is to encourage
students to critically question the law.98 He argues that “students would be
90.

Id.

91.

Id.

92.

Id.

93.

Ricketts, Legal Education, supra note 86, at 5.

94.

Id.

95.

Id. at 6.

96.

Id.

97.

Id.

98.

See generally Ricketts, Loaded Knowledge, supra note 50. Noting that such an approach to
legal education would be radical, he explains that
One of the most common criticisms of traditional legal education is the tendency to
treat lawful authority and legitimacy as a given. The combination of students with little
pre-existing inclination to question the fundamental foundations of the legal system
with a traditional legal educational approach that puts such questions firmly out of
bounds is a classical example of why so much legal education could be described as
anti-critical by nature.
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most challenged when provoked to deeply question: 1) existing assumptions
about the legitimacy of centralized legal authority; and (to a lesser degree)
2) the usefulness of law as a tool for social control.”99 Ricketts posits that
“these two ideas could be described as the most likely threshold issues that
students would be challenged to traverse in the process of developing a critical
approach to legal phenomena . . . .”100
Finally, Nick James, an Associate Professor at the TC Beirne School of Law,
University of Queensland, argues that “thinking like a lawyer” is a threshold
concept of legal education.101 James acknowledges the varying definitions for
what it means to think like a lawyer. He notes that “[f]or many, the phrase is
interpreted narrowly to mean engaging in formal legal reasoning: recognizing
legal issues, locating the relevant legal rules, applying the rules to the facts of
a problem, and reaching a rational and convincing conclusion.”102 The term
can also include “the ability to identify and work with the policies underlying
the legal rules and take advantage of the fundamental indeterminacy in the
law.”103 Even more broadly, legal reasoning can serve “as a style of thinking that
is logical, rigorous, value-neutral and unemotional, or characterized by certain
traits such as resistance to jumping to conclusions, a tolerance of ambiguity,
a tendency to engage in ‘devil’s advocacy’, and a preference for facts over
emotions.”104 James explains that
The common characteristic of these proffered definitions is the explicit or
implicit insistence that to think like a lawyer a student must not only know
the law but also be willing and able to set aside their intuitive or emotional
response to a legal issue and to ignore their personal beliefs about “right or

Id.
99.

Id. at 53.

100. Id.
101. See Nickolas James, Teaching First Year Law Students to Think Like (Good) Lawyers, in
First Year Experience in Law School: A New Beginning? (Leon Wolff & Maria Nicolae eds.,
Halstead Press: Sydney 2013) (copy on file with author). James asserts that
[I]nstead of treating “thinking like a lawyer” as something to be learned by law
students immediately and treating an appreciation of ethical practice and social justice
as something to be learned by law students by the time they graduate, “thinking
like a lawyer” should be redefined to include an appreciation of ethical practice and
social justice, and the redefined notion of “thinking like a (good) lawyer” should be
repositioned as an explicit threshold concept for first year law students.
Id. at 1.
102. Id. (citing Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer: A New Introduction to Legal
Reasoning (Harvard Univ. Press, 2009)).
103. Id. (citing Kenneth J Vandevelde, Thinking Like a Lawyer: An Introduction to Legal
Reasoning (Westview Press, 2d ed. 2010)).
104. Id. (citations omitted).
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wrong” and “fair or unfair.”. . . [T]hey must be rational and objective in the
application of legal rules to reach a logically defensible conclusion.105

James argues that because “[l]aw students are taught from their first day of
law school to separate what they do as a lawyer from their personal values in
order to be neutral and objective,”106 they are given the incorrect impression
that ethics and justice “are of marginal importance to the study and practice
of law.”107 Thus, James would redefine thinking like a lawyer to “include an
appreciation of ethical practice and social justice.”108 Further, “the redefined
notion of ‘thinking like a (good) lawyer’ should be repositioned as an explicit
threshold concept for first year law students.”109
These scholars support legal reasoning, or thinking like a lawyer, as a
threshold concept by assessing it against such concepts’ characteristics. Legal
reasoning is bounded “in that it marks a line of differentiation between the
discipline of law and other disciplines.”110 It is integrative “because it facilitates
student understanding about what lawyers (solicitors, barristers, judges etc.)
are doing: why it is possible to have multiple perspectives and arguments.”111
Learning to think like a lawyer is irreversible because once students “learn
how to think like a lawyer it is difficult to return to their earlier way of thinking
about law—they can’t go back to being ‘naïve.’”112 Put simply, “The ability to
apply legal reasoning is irreversible. Once you are able to reason, analyze and

105. Id.
106. Id. at 2 (noting that law students “are taught to disregard what they believe to be good and
fair in favour of identifying the relevant legal rules and applying them objectively to the facts
of a legal problem”).
107. Id. To the contrary, James contends “[e]thics and justice are relevant considerations when
lawyers engage with the law, and when called upon to engage with the law a lawyer’s
personal values frequently do come into play.” Id. (emphasis in original).
108. Id.
109. Id. James concludes that
By expanding the notion of “thinking like a lawyer” to include an appreciation of
the importance of ethical practice and social justice, we acknowledge that questions
of “right or wrong” and “fair or unfair” are appropriate topics for lawyerly reflection,
which in turn gives the students permission to incorporate their personal beliefs and
values into the legal reasoning process.
Id. at 17.
110. James, supra note 101, at 5.
111.

Akerlind et al., Threshold Concepts Focus, supra note 87, at 3. The authors further explain
that “[l]egal reasoning inculcates students into the integrated nature of the culture of legal
argument and the importance of authority and evidence to the efficacy of legal argument.”
Id. James asserts that thinking like a lawyer, or legal reasoning as he has broadly defined it,
“unites the various law topics studied at law school.” James, supra note 101, at 5.

112. James, supra note 101, at 5
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argue like a lawyer, and use authority to provide evidence for a position and
assertions, you cannot undo that skill.”113
Legal reasoning is also troublesome. “[I]t contradicts some of the students’
prior assumptions (or everyday ways of knowing things) up to the point of
entry to law school, and therefore it takes them out of their comfort zone.”114
Finally, learning to think like a lawyer is transformative. “[O]nce understood
law students think differently not only about the subject of their studies but
the legal, political and social issues they hear about in the media and encounter
in their daily lives.”115 “Legal reasoning is transformative because being able to
engage in it provides students with a sense of self-identity as a lawyer; they
pass through a portal of knowing what it means to be a lawyer.”116
B. Malleability as a Threshold Concept in Legal Education
While the foregoing arguments for legal reasoning—or thinking like a
lawyer—as a threshold concept are alluring, I would suggest that it is too
broad to be considered a threshold concept. Rather, I define thinking like a lawyer
expansively to include ability to do the following:
• Identify legal issues and locate relevant authority;
• Use an inductive reasoning to evaluate relevant authorities;
• Reconcile and synthesize prior cases;
• Engage in rule-based and analogical reasoning;
• Identify relevant policy considerations;
• Recognize the malleability of legal principles;
• Identify and evaluate ethical and professional considerations in
analyzing a client matter;
• Identify and evaluate competing arguments and weigh the relative
strength of those arguments;
• Predict probable results and make recommendations from among
alternative courses of action;
113.

Akerlind et al., Threshold Concepts Focus, supra note 87, at 3.

114. Id. Legal reasoning
[i]nvolves learning how to take responsibility for your position and your argument. It
contradicts the possibility of simply making assertions without backing them up, or of
finding the one ‘right’ answer. It forces students to re-consider, and possibly to change,
their preconceptions about what law is and what law can achieve.
Id. Further, James explains, “students must learn to both set aside their personal views and
values in favour of objectivity and neutrality, and accept the fundamental contingency of law
and legal reasoning.” James, supra note 101, at 5.
115.

Id.

116. Akerlind et al., Threshold Concepts Focus, supra note 87, at 3. The authors observe that
“[o]nce inducted into legal reasoning a student is able to look at the other side, accept there
isn’t a right answer, know that they have to think deeply about meaning and argument, and
be persuasive.” Id.
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• Adopt a client-centered approach to legal reasoning;
• “Apply critical reasoning to legal issues through independent thought
and judgment informed by an understanding of legal principles and the
concepts, principles, policies, and values that underpin and permeate
the law;”117 and
• “Evaluate opinions, make decisions, and reflect critically on the
justifications for decisions in the light of legal principles.”118
Many of these skills are complicated and difficult for students. And, many may
exhibit characteristics of a threshold concept. Malleability exhibits all of them
and is a portal to understanding how to think like a lawyer. In contrast, thinking
like a lawyer, read broadly to encompass the sophisticated skills listed above,
is an aspirational goal of legal education, or a graduate attribute.119
James argues that while “[t]he ability to think like a lawyer is usually
identified as an outcome of legal education—as a graduate attribute,”120
“[t]hinking like a lawyer is a key idea, concept or process that needs to be
understood by a student before they can understand other parts of the
degree—a ‘portal or gateway which once the learner has passed through it
will illuminate and underpin much subsequent understanding.’”121 I heartily
endorse James’ suggestion that teaching students to think like a lawyer should
include an explicit emphasis on considerations of ethics and social justice.122
However, I am not persuaded that thinking like a lawyer “is something a law
117.

James, supra note 101, at 2.

118. Id.
119. By “graduate attribute” I simply mean the information and skills that law students should be
expected to know or understand when they graduate. See Vicki Waye & Margaret Faulkner,
Embedding E-Portfolios in a Law Program: Lessons from an Australian Law School, 61 J.
Legal Educ. 560 (2012). The authors explain
Australian law schools aim to impart skills and values such as leadership, effective
communication, problem solving, organization, critical reflection, adaptability,
creativity, and social responsibility. These general understandings and competencies
are collectively known as graduate attributes or graduate qualities. In Australia and
the United Kingdom, graduate attributes transcend specific fields of study given
the likelihood that graduates will pursue a range of career paths over their lifetimes.
Nevertheless, because graduate attributes are developed within the context of particular
programs of study, they are interpreted and cultivated with specific discipline practices
in mind.
Id. at 565 (citations omitted).
120. James, supra note 101, at 2.
121. Id. at 4.
122. Id. at 2–5, 17. See also Melissa H. Weresh, Legal Writing: Ethical and Professional
Considerations (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., 2d. ed. 2009); Melissa H. Weresh, Fostering
a Respect for our Students, our Specialty, and the Legal Profession: Introducing Ethics and
Professionalism into the Legal Writing Curriculum, 21 Touro L. Rev. 427 (2005); Melissa H.
Weresh, An Integrated Approach to Teaching Ethics and Professionalism, 18 No. 2 Prof.
Law 25 (2007).
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student must be able to do from the very beginning of their studies to succeed
in their study of the law”123 or that it “is a pre-requisite to engaging with the
content of almost every law subject.”124 The difference may be in semantics,
or in how we define “thinking like a lawyer.” Read broadly to include the
features James suggests, I would argue, makes the concept too expansive to
be considered threshold.
I think the aspirational graduate attribute of thinking broadly as a lawyer
requires the mastery of core and threshold concepts. Core concepts that “help
students initially to see the subject in a different way are not integrative and
so not threshold concepts as such, although they can act as transformative
thresholds for individual students.”125 Threshold concepts, in contrast, open
“up the subject through the integration of other concepts.”126 Malleability, as
explored below, is one of those concepts.
I would argue, however, that thinking like a lawyer falls into another category,
one “too broad to be called a concept.”127 Thinking like a lawyer may be better
described “as a disciplinarily specific way of thinking, but it still does serve as
an important transformative threshold for students.”128 This way of thinking
is “unlikely, however, to be experienced as a single event, as can happen with
a threshold concept, but rather as a growing awareness of the nature of the
discipline as a whole, along with the steady build up of professionally relevant
knowledge and skills.”129 Indeed, the Akerlind et al. group that identified legal
reasoning as a threshold concept acknowledged the potential over-breadth of
this concept, noting that “the transformative nature of legal reasoning can also
be seen as a staircase rather than a portal—that is, its development might take
three or four semesters (or a lifetime), but the teaching of the concept in the
first year is a critical first step on that staircase.”130
123. James, supra note 101, at 4.
124. Id.
125. Entwistle, supra note 5, at 32.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. (noting that “[c]onceptions of knowledge and learning represent thresholds of this
broader kind . . .”).
130. Akerlind et al., Threshold Concepts Focus, supra note 87, at 3. In terms of the depth and
breadth of the concept, Akerlind et al. identified four levels of understanding for the concept
of legal reasoning. They articulated these levels as follows:
1. a formulaic process for predicting a legal outcome; 2. an interpretative process of
arguing for an outcome serving the needs of the client; 3. a dynamic, responsive and
innovative process for allowing the existing law to reflect changes in society; and 4. a
means by which law can be changed for the good of society, where it is necessary to use
the law as an instrument to effect social change.
Id. at 304. It is likely that stages 3 and 4, and possibly stage 2, require an understanding of
the malleability of law.
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The concept of malleability, or, put another way, the latitude a lawyer
has in articulating legal principles,131 is a threshold concept. As Elaine
Webster observes, “a fundamental characteristic of law is its contingency,
which encapsulates the existence of predictability alongside indeterminacy
and contextual dependence in legal interpretation.”132 Webster and Claire
McDiarmid, lecturers at the law school at the University of Strathclyde in
Glasgow, assert contingency and contested narrative as threshold concepts in
law.133 As a threshold concept introduced in the first year, implicitly in courses
relying on a Socratic dialogue and explicitly in many legal analysis and writing
courses, malleability—standing alone134—is bounded, integrative, irreversible,
troublesome, and transformative.
The malleability of legal principles, in legal reasoning and advocacy, is
bounded within the legal discipline; it informs how law-trained individuals
approach the law not as a static set of rules but as a framework to scaffold
legal argument. Malleability is also integrative. It brings together other
concepts within legal analysis, such as jurisdiction, precedential value, rule
131.

Of course, this flexibility is not without limits. Ethical and professional norms circumscribe
the ability of an advocate to support an assertion with authority that, in fact, contradicts or
falls short of supporting the position advanced.

132. Elaine Webster & Claire McDiarmid, Contingency in Practice: Applying a Threshold
Concept in Law in Threshold Concepts: From personal practice to Communities of Practice
53 (2012), available at http://www.nairtl.ie/documents/BookofAbstracts_ONLINE.pdf?PH
PSESSID=be9b1e9ab9356a4ab602bb26cae384d9.
133. See Elaine Webster & Claire McDiarmid, Contingency and Contested Narrative: A
Threshold Concept in Legal Education at UKCLE, UK Centre for Legal Education, July 9,
2010, available at http://78.158.56.101/archive/law/resources/directions/issue-20-spring-2010/
contingency-and-contested-narrative-a-threshold-co/index.html [hereinafter Webster &
McDiarmid, Contested Narrative].
134. By “standing alone” I mean to reinforce that understanding the malleability of law is itself
a threshold concept. Webster and McDiarmid go further, adding contested narrative and
indeterminancy to the threshold concept identification. Webster & McDiarmid, Contested
Narrative, supra note 132, at 8. “We build into our exposition the idea of law as a contested
narrative and survey some of the implications of this view.” Id. The authors acknowledge
the “difficult questions that may follow from asserting that law is contested narrative (e.g.
the implication that law is ‘only’ narrative; see Baron and Epstein 1997).” Id. at 9. While I
find their observations regarding contested narrative persuasive, the narrower concept of
malleability of law arguably stands alone as a threshold concept. In other words, I do not
intend the term malleability to extend to the broader debate regarding indeterminacy in law.
See Ross Meyer, supra note 2. Meyer condenses the debate to the following:
The theoretical dangers of legal indeterminacy, and the practical reality of it, have
spawned a prodigious literature in legal theory. The participants agree that radical
uncertainty desperately undermines the legitimacy of law and legal institutions. The
question is whether law is, indeed, so radically indeterminate. On the one hand are
those theorists who assert that it is—that there is never an easy case because a valid legal
argument can be constructed on either side of even the “clearest” application of law to
facts. On the other hand are those theorists who counter that the law is indeterminate
only in a few hard cases, where there are legal gaps.
Id. at 1468–69 (citations omitted).
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of law, and stare decisis. “Crossing the threshold allows student to recognize
simultaneously law’s certainty—a quality which its continued credibility
requires it to possess—alongside its essential malleability.”135 It is irreversible;
once a student understands that the law can be approached critically and with
a degree of latitude, the concept cannot be unlearned.
Malleability of law is also troublesome and transformative. Students
typically come to law school with an understanding that the law represents
a set of rules that govern society. The idea that those rules are malleable
may be counter-intuitive, alien, or even objectionable.136 The “fundamental
uncertainty over what ‘the law’ is—an issue which had hitherto been regarded
as certain and definable—may indeed be conceptually difficult for students.
Consequently, they may experience this turning point as challenging and it
may give rise to further unsettling realizations.”137 Once understood, however,
students cross a threshold and their understanding of the law, and of legal
reasoning, is transformed. They no longer will view the law as a fixed set of
rules but will appreciate the role the advocate has in shaping legal argument
and the resulting institution of law.138
This idea is supported by the Akerlind et al. study that identified legal
reasoning as a threshold concept. The researchers focused on variation theory,
which posits “misunderstandings (or [a] less sophisticated understanding)
of a disciplinary concept may be explained in terms of students’ lack of
awareness of key features or aspects of a concept.”139 In addressing variation
135. Webster & McDiarmid, Contested Narrative, supra note 133, at 8.
136. See Laura P. Graham & Miriam E. Felsenbug, Beginning Legal Writers in Their Own Words:
Why the First Weeks of Legal Writing are so Tough and What We Can Do About It, 16 Legal
Writing: J. Legal Writing Inst. 223, 256 (2010). The authors surveyed first-year law students
during the first eight weeks of their first semester. Id. at 246–56. After approximately two
months of instruction, students were asked how their opinions had changed as to what the
study of law involves. Id. While most students did not acknowledge a change in opinion, for
the ones who did “a common theme was that the law was not as concrete as they thought.”
Id. at 256. Student responses included the following observations:
“Yes, it is researching in order to make an educated guess; the law is not as definite as
I thought it would be.”
“Concepts are much more fluid than I anticipated. I am learning that there are few
hard and fast ways to apply the concepts we learn.”
“Yes .... The law itself as a discipline is more subjective and less empirical than I could
have imagined.”
“Yes, there is a great deal of ambiguity and lack of clarity.”
Id. These statements reinforce the counter-intuitive or alien nature of the malleability of law.
137.

Webster & McDiarmid, Contested Narrative, supra note 133, at 9. See also Ross Meyer, supra
note 2, at 1468.

138. Webster & McDiarmid, Contested Narrative, supra note 133, at 9 (noting that students “come
to understand law as a normative institution shaped by actors within the law, after which
it is impossible to view one’s role as an interpreter of law as the exercise of pre-determined,
mechanical application of rules”).
139. Gerlese Akerlind, Jo McKenzie & Dr. Mandy Lupton, Final Report: A Threshold Concepts
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in student understanding, the researchers noted, “students’ understanding of
‘the nature of legal rules’ was identified as a feature of overall understanding
of legal reasoning.”140 The researchers identified “the least sophisticated
way of understanding legal reasoning as ‘a formulaic process for predicting
a legal outcome,’ involve[ing] an understanding of legal rules as rigid,
unchangeable and completely clear . . . in other words, the potential for
variation in interpretation of legal rules has not been discerned.”141 However,
once the malleability of law has been recognized, “a more sophisticated
understanding of legal reasoning [emerges], as ‘an interpretive process of
arguing for an outcome that serves your client,’ include awareness of legal
rules as manipulable, interpretable and ambiguous.”142 These findings arguably
support the position that malleability is a threshold concept for sophisticated
and disciplinary-specific legal reasoning.
Professors who teach legal analysis seem to agree that malleability is
likely a threshold concept. In an informal query of legal writing professors
on the Legal Writing Institute143 listserv, professors were asked to evaluate
core and threshold concepts in a first-year legal analysis and writing course.
Respondents were given a brief background on threshold concepts144 and
Focus to Curricular Design: Supporting Student Learning through Application of Variation
Theory 3 (2011), available at http://www.olt.gov.au/system/files/resources/PP8_885_Final_
Report_Akerlind_2011.pdf [hereinafter Akerlind et al., Final Report].
140. Id. at 6.
141. Id. (emphasis in original).
142. Id. (stressing that, at this stage, “the potential for variation in that critical feature of legal
reasoning has been discerned”).
143. The Legal Writing Institute (LWI) is a non-profit organization dedicated to improving legal
writing by providing a forum for discussion and scholarship about legal writing, analysis,
and research. See Legal Writing Institute :: LWI Online, available at http://www.lwionline.
org/index.html
144. The query provided the following background material:
Researchers have proposed that threshold concepts (TCs) exist within disciplines,
and that the identification of these TCs can assist educators in evaluating curricular
outcomes and pedagogies to support student learning. TCs are considered central and
essential to the mastery of a subject and have been generally defined to include four
characteristics:
1. They are transformative—once grasped, they represent a conceptual shift in
understanding.
2. They are (probably) irreversible—once understood, they are unlikely to be forgotten.
3. They are troublesome—they may appear counter-intuitive and are conceptually
challenging for students.
4. They are integrative—mastery of a TC allows the learner to make connections and
identify relationships that were previously unknown or unidentifiable.
TCs are distinguishable from core concepts in terms of the above characteristics. A
core concept is better characterized as a building block, or a foundational concept
that progresses the understanding of a subject. A core concept must be understood
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then were asked to identify each of the following as either a core or threshold
concept: identification and framing of legal issues; close case reading;
contingency/malleability of statements of law; understanding stare decisis;
understanding the difference between mandatory and persuasive precedent;
identification of rule structures; inductive reasoning; deductive reasoning;
analogical reasoning; rule-based reasoning; materiality of facts; understanding
legal narrative; case synthesis; understanding of types of legal argument;
understanding of hierarchy of authority; effective selection of legal authority;
effective use of legal authority; adopting authoritative voice in legal writing;
making predictions about application of law where appropriate; and critical
analysis of law. Out of 79 responses, 54 identified malleability as a threshold
concept.
Only case synthesis received a higher score. Out of 84 responses, 59
identified case synthesis as a threshold concept. Case synthesis is a complex
skill associated with legal reasoning and requires an understanding of many
legal principles. Joan Kent Gionfriddo describes the process as such: “Lawyers
begin th[e] process of synthesis by first identifying the pieces of authority
relevant to a legal issue and then fitting these pieces together to determine
the overall analytical framework they reasonably support. This step requires
understanding the nature and hierarchy of authority in our legal system.”145 In
addition to understanding hierarchy and stare decisis, lawyers must be able to
identify the implicit and explicit rationale for each ruling,146 and must be able
to articulate legal principles from each case that can be tested back against the
group of cases. “While an explanation does not need to have been articulated
by any one court within the group, it must make logical sense in relationship
to the facts and results of each individual case and its explicitly articulated
doctrine and reasoning.”147
in order to progress, but that understanding does not necessarily lead to a cognitive
or qualitatively different understanding of a subject. In contrast, a TC represents
a transformed way of understanding. Examples of TCs include complex numbers in
mathematics, opportunity cost in economics, and signification in literary and cultural studies.
Identifying TCs can assist educators in designing a streamlined pedagogy focused on
fundamental elements of a subject. To the extent TCs are troublesome, they also reveal
the places in the curriculum where students struggle. Distinguishing between TCs
and core concepts may further assist educators in identifying critical curricular pieces
that, while perhaps not transformative, are essential building blocks to fundamental
conceptual shifts.
E-mail from Melissa H. Weresh, Prof. of Law, Drake University Law School, to LRWPROF
and DIRCON listservs, Threshold Concepts, July 10, 2012 (copy on file with author).
145. Jane Kent Gionfriddo, Thinking Like a Lawyer: The Heuristics of Case Synthesis, 40 Tex.
Tech L. Rev. 1, 4 (2007) (citations omitted) (explaining a methodology for case synthesis)
[hereinafter Gionfriddo, Synthesis].
146. Id. at 10–16.
147. Id. at 14–15 (citations omitted) (explaining that “lawyers must evaluate the significance
of each case in relationship to all other cases in the group and then hypothesize possible
explanations of the court’s implicit meaning. Depending on the particular group of cases,
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Gionfriddo further explains that the process of case synthesis, and
particularly the process of testing back explanations against the category
of authority, may vary depending upon whether a lawyer is engaged in an
objective analysis as opposed to when she is framing legal arguments.148 There
is a reasonable zone of interpretation of prior legal authority—a concept of
malleability—that may differ in objective versus persuasive analysis. “In an
objective analysis, the reasonable zone may include more than one explanation,
but all of the explanations should be reasonably supported by the current body
of case law, even if the lawyer has moved into inferential reasoning.”149 However,
“when lawyers craft arguments that push the parameters of the current case
law, testing back explanations may take on a somewhat more expansive role
that results in a broader reasonable zone of right explanations.”150
Given this framework, malleability is likely a threshold concept for case
synthesis. Examining the potential breadth of prior judicial decisions is part
of the process of case synthesis.151 When synthesizing cases, “ideas are accurate
because they fall within a range of analysis—even if creative or novel—that
‘reasonably’ interprets relevant, controlling legal authority, and ‘reasonably’
argues how that interpretation affects the client’s problem.”152 Understanding
how broadly or narrowly a case may be construed—understanding the limits
of its malleability—is therefore a threshold concept to synthesis. As Professor
K.N. Llewellyn explains with respect to synthesis,
more than one explanation might reasonably be inferred from the cases”).
148. Id. at 16–18.
149. Id. at 16 (citations omitted) (noting that “these explanations should strictly test back on the
cases in the sense of being consistent with each case’s relevant facts, results, and explicit
reasoning”).
150. Id. Gionfriddo further explains that “[u]nder the doctrine of stare decisis, arguments in
these circumstances need to generally consider the current body of precedent but do not
necessarily need to test back on the cases in the same strict manner required in an objective
analysis.” Id.
151.

See, e.g., Michael D. Murray, Rule Synthesis and Explanatory Synthesis: A Socratic Dialogue
Between IREAC and TREAT, 8 Legal Comm. & Rhetoric: JALWD 217, 234 (2011). Murray
explains the process of explanatory synthesis:
Incremental principles of interpretation may be induced from different sets of
precedents. Different, parallel storylines may be drawn out from several cases and
depicted in such a way that the storylines converge with the client’s narrative. Public
policies may be exhibited in a variety of factual settings to reveal that the client’s facts
further the workings of the policies. Explanatory syntheses should explore the deeper,
fundamental connections between cases whose outcome is favorable to the client and
those that are not, so as to analogize to a whole group of favorable precedents and
distinguish an entire group of unfavorable precedents.
Id.

152. Jane Kent Gionfriddo, The “Reasonable Zone of Right Answers”: Analytical Feedback
on Student Writing, 40 Gonz. L. Rev. 427, 432 (2005) (noting that “[i]deas outside this
‘reasonable zone’ are incorrect”).
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No case can have a meaning by itself! Standing alone it gives you no guidance.
It can give you no guidance as to how far it carries, as to how much of its language
will hold water later. What counts, what gives you leads, what gives you sureness,
that is the background of the other cases in relation to which you must read
the one. They color the language, the technical terms, used in the opinion.
But above all they give you the wherewithal to find which of the facts are
significant, and in what aspect they are significant, and how far the rules laid down
are to be trusted.153

Case synthesis also may be a threshold concept in legal education, and a
threshold for sophisticated legal reasoning. It is likely bounded, insofar as it
exists within the legal discipline, although it does replicate predictive reasoning
in a non-legal environment. Case synthesis also may be integrative, as it requires
students to pull together other, related core concepts such as formulating a
rule of law, stare decisis, and inductive reasoning. Once mastered, it is likely
irreversible. Case synthesis is challenging for first-year law students and may
appear counter-intuitive or alien. It may, therefore, be troublesome. Finally,
case synthesis, once mastered, may be transformative. However, I would argue
that understanding malleability is a threshold concept for students to proceed
to case synthesis. Moreover, an understanding of case synthesis is likely a
threshold concept to understanding legal reasoning, or understanding how to
think like a lawyer. In sum, malleability is likely a threshold for case synthesis,
which is a threshold to more fully developed legal reasoning.154
C. Implications of Identifying Malleability as a Threshold Concept
There are three potential implications of identifying malleability as a
threshold concept in legal education. First, and most broadly, a consensus
formed on this among faculty should provide a powerful lens for viewing
student understanding across the curriculum. Second, once it or other
discipline- or doctrine-specific threshold concepts are identified, these concepts
can be made explicit to students in applicable courses. Finally, faculty can
coordinate instruction on threshold concepts, including the use of consistent
nomenclature and assessment techniques, and the development of appropriate
benchmarks for student progress.
Threshold concepts research developed within a “teaching for
understanding” conceptual framework underpinning the Enhancing
Teaching and Learning project. “Threshold concepts have [] emerged as a
set of transferable or portable ideas across disciplinary contexts, which offer
new insights into teaching and learning.”155 Teaching for understanding is “a
153. Gionfriddo, Synthesis, supra note 145, at n.13 (emphasis added) (citing K.N. Llewellyn, The
Bramble Bush: On Our Law and Its Study 48 (Oceana Pub. Inc. 1996)).
154. I leave it to another legal educator to further explore this possibility.
155. Ray Land, Jan H. F. Meyer & Jan Smith, Editors’ Preface to Threshold Concepts within
the Disciplines xi (Ray Land, Jan H. F. Meyer & Jan Smith, ed., Sense Pub. 2008) (noting
that threshold concepts is “principally an analytical framework for trying to understand how
students learn, where the barriers to their learning lie, be they epistemological or ontological,
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way of developing a curriculum so as to focus directly on the development of
understanding.”156 Developing a curriculum for student understanding begins
with the educator identifying “overarching goals for the course which guide
the identification of generative topics. These goals are repeatedly presented
to the students in the form of throughlines which help them to see how the
topics and themes within the course hang together.”157 Next, the educator
develops “a set of generative topics” that are ‘issues, themes, concepts, ideas,
and so on that provide enough depth, significance, connections, and variety of
perspective to support students’ development of powerful understandings”158
“From these generative topics follow the identification, first, of a series
of understanding aims, and then of a range of tasks which will demand
understanding performances.”159 Teaching for understanding demands that
students receive formative assessment so that both student and educator assess
student understanding.160 Finally, teaching and assessment processes should
be aligned with intended learning outcomes.161
Just as identifying threshold concepts in other disciplines has informed
their instruction, an identification of such concepts in legal education should
help improve teaching of the law. It will help teachers understand where in
the curriculum their students struggle. “The significance of the framework
provided by threshold concepts lies in its explanatory potential to locate
troublesome aspects of disciplinary knowledge within transitions across
conceptual thresholds and hence to assist teachers in identifying appropriate
ways of modifying or redesigning curricula to enable their students to
negotiate such transitions more successfully.”162 This article intends primarily
to introduce threshold-concepts theory to legal education, and to posit a
potential threshold concept applicable across the law school curriculum.163
and what appropriate pedagogical adjustments or modifications might overcome such
difficulties”) [hereinafter Meyer et al. Preface].
156. Noel Entwistle, Concepts and Conceptual Frameworks Underpinning the ETL Project,
Occasional Report 6 (ETL Project, Universities of Edinburgh, Coventry and Durham,
2003), available at http://www.etl.tla.ed.ac.uk/docs/ETLreport3.pdf.
157.

Id.

158. Id. (citations omitted).
159. Id. (noting that “[t]hese performances focus on rather different aspects of the target
understanding and so cumulatively help students to understand in ways accepted by the
teacher”).
160. Id. (stressing that “the framework insists that assessment should be ongoing or formative,
providing students with feedback about their work and also allowing both teacher and
students to assess how well students’ understanding is developing”).
161. Id. (emphasizing that “that the main aims of any course should be oriented towards
conceptual understanding and high level learning outcomes”).
162. Meyer et al., Preface, supra note 155, at xi.
163. My sense is that there may be two types of threshold concepts in legal education—
discipline-specific concepts and doctrine-specific concepts. See Webb, New Tool, supra
note 85, at 11. Webb questions whether “there is a network of legal threshold concepts
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But there are apparent implications to identifying malleability as a threshold
concept in the law school curriculum.
First, by simply incorporating this theory’s concepts, a new lens is provided
for evaluating how students learn. Legal educators may find that exploring
these concepts is deeply informative, across the discipline and within doctrine
specific areas. Threshold-concepts theory in other disciplines “has intrigued,
confused and engaged many academics who would normally not consider
thinking out loud about teaching.”164 We can’t help but find weak spots, craft
innovations in and improve our legal curriculum if we were to employ elements
of this theory to evaluate where students struggle with it but where learning
helps transform their thinking in a disciplinary-specific manner.
An evaluation of student learning and, particularly, a focus on where law
students struggle, provides other ways to improve legal education. Judith
Welch Wegner characterized the reform of legal education as a “wicked
problem,”165 and she examined the many dimensions in teaching students to
that are discipline-wide and fundamental to making sense of the discipline” that might
be contrasted with subject-specific or, as I have termed them, doctrine-specific threshold
concepts. Id. Malleability is a threshold concept that transcends the law school curriculum,
as it is a concept that informs legal analysis broadly. Other universally applicable, disciplinespecific threshold concepts might include precedent, materiality, and analogy. See id. at 11
(identifying materiality and analogy as “intuitive” threshold concepts in law). There are also
likely doctrine-specific threshold concepts such as the corporation as entity, constitutional
interpretive strategies, and allocation of risk. See id. at 11 (identifying allocation of risk
as a potential threshold concept). As noted, the primary goal of this article is to spark a
discussion within the legal academy about what threshold concepts exist in legal education
and, if malleability is one, how an acknowledgement of that concept as a threshold concept
might improve instruction for student understanding.
164. Baillie et al., Knowledge Capability, supra note 22, at 244.
165. See Judith Welch Wegner, Reframing Legal Education’s “Wicked Problems,” 61 Rutgers
L. Rev. 867 (2009). Wegner explains the term “wicked problem” was “coined by Horst
Rittel and Melvin Webber to describe a class of problems that cannot readily be resolved by
conventional analytical means, particularly in the realms of public policy or design.” Id. at
870 (citations omitted).
A “wicked problem” is one that cannot be definitively described or understood (since
it is differently seen by differing stake-holders, has numerous causes, and is often a
symptom of other problems). “Wicked problems” cannot readily be resolved (since
they are characterized by a “no stopping rule” resulting from cascading consequences
that are difficult to discern at the outset), and can only be addressed in ‘better or worse’
ways, rather than by proving solutions are “true” or “false.” “Wicked problems” occur
when the factors affecting possible resolution are difficult to recognize, contradictory,
and changing; the problem is embedded in a complex system with many unclear
interdependencies, and possible solutions cannot readily be selected from competing
alternatives.
Id. at 870–71 (citations omitted). Wegner identifies legal education reform as a wicked
problem, explaining that
There is no generally accepted definition of the problems faced (although the recent
Carnegie Report and Best Practices study have suggested some dimensions). There’s
no “stopping rule” for reform since there are so many interrelated questions that one
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“think like a lawyer.”166 She observed that “a deep and fundamental shift occurs
in the nature of knowledge and knowing in conjunction with the development
of advanced reasoning routines, a shift that is recognized only in retrospect
and rarely clearly stated or understood.”167 Because threshold concepts are

can never be “done,” only exhausted for the moment. Solutions tend to be better or
worse, rather than “true or false,” despite the tendency of many to wish for confirming
evidence before acting. Every “one-shot” reform affects other dynamics within an
ever-changing educational institution. There is not a set of standard solutions that
takes into account the unique characteristics of individual schools (such as student
characteristics, faculty preferences, location, institutional culture, available resources),
even though faculty members typically want to know what others have done in order
to borrow models from schools viewed as peers.
Id. at 876.
166. Id. at 894. The relationship between legal reasoning, and understanding the uncertainty or
malleability of law, was identified as part of the skill of thinking like a lawyer. “A faculty
member at a Canadian school explained that ‘thinking like a lawyer’ required development
of analytical skills not previously understood by undergraduates: ‘Our goal is for them to
think critically about what they’re doing. Don’t just take the law as the law . . . . It will
make them more versatile . . . . [Get] them to question assumptions.’” Id. at 900. Students
similarly pointed to the uncertainty of law as troublesome in terms of legal reasoning.
“Some emphasized the inherent uncertainty of knowledge associated with the law. Said a
scientist: ‘the material [in law] is not that hard, but science is black and white and law is gray
. . . I’d been used to thinking there was one answer and making sure to put that down on
paper.’ Others spoke of the way in which what counts as knowledge is constructed. A doctor
explained that medicine and law are very different: ‘There are right answers in science. With
law it’s a matter of making a case.’” Id. at 901.
		
These observations about understanding uncertainty of legal principles—or
malleability—track the threshold concepts theory. As Wegner explains:
These subtle distinctions in the nature of knowledge and the ways in which
knowledge is constructed seem illusive and in some respects hard to comprehend.
Yet numerous students described the process of learning to “think like a lawyer” in
terms that suggested they’d experienced a significant and illusive “phase shift” in the
nature of their thinking. This realization that something had “clicked” is difficult to
communicate and is often appreciated only in retrospect . . .
Students’ growing appreciation for the complex nature of knowledge (it is not
absolute, is associated with evidence or argument, and depends on more than one’s
personal view) parallels the findings of leading theorists who have studied intellectual
development among college students and traced evolving relationships with certainty
and doubt.
Id. at 901–02.
167. Id. at 903 (noting that “[k]nowledge is no longer simply received from experts, but must
be constructed, since law is by its nature ‘gray’”). This retrospective awareness of an
epistemological shift is consistent with other aspects of threshold concepts theory, including
transformation, troublesome knowledge, and integration. “The developmental trend
that is thus apparent is consistent with research in other contexts that suggests that such
epistemological phase shifts may be closely related to development of capacities for abstract
forms of reasoning, dissatisfaction with existing beliefs, and identification of intelligible and
useful alternatives that can be linked to earlier conceptions, motivation and context.” Id.
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embedded in faculty ways of thinking and practicing,168 “[d]evelopmental
struggles are therefore generally invisible and poorly articulated at best.” If
faculty work together to make apparent and explicit the threshold concepts
that students must master to become members of a discourse community, they
may be in a better position to create teaching objectives and exercises to help
students with them.169
Similar collaborative efforts by educators could be a boon to students in
mastering discipline-specific threshold concepts in legal education. This may
mean different things in different courses. But I suggest two concrete ways in
which the identification of malleability as a threshold concept might improve
first-year curricular development. Educators could collaborate to 1) make it
an explicit threshold concept across the first-year curricular development and
2) coordinate instructional materials and assessment techniques to broadly
reinforce its understanding by all students.
Malleability, as defined here, is an understanding of the latitude or
flexibility a lawyer has in articulating legal principles. Students would be
well-served if they got started as early on as possible to grapple with it.170 As
one scholar has recognized, “Threshold concepts can be best understood as
tacit constructs that often sit behind the explicit domain knowledge, and may
therefore operate as unrecognized, or at least unacknowledged, assumptions
in the tutor’s teaching.”171 To ensure students master this threshold concept, it
must be made apparent, or explicit.172
168. See id (“Few faculty or students are conscious of their epistemological beliefs, let alone of
ways in which they may change.”).
169. See id (“Recognizing and explaining that students must confront uncertainty on this deeper
and less obvious level may prove an important step in helping them more readily come to
terms with the insistent questioning and sophisticated routines of reasoning associated with
studying law.”).
170. See David Perkins, Beyond Understanding, in Threshold Concepts within the Disciplines, 3
(Ray Land, Jan H. F. Meyer & Jan Smith, eds., Sense Pub. 2008). Perkins explains:
The idea of threshold concepts carries an important pedagogical message: where we
can find likely threshold concepts, we would do well to organize learning around
them. But there is a cost, in fact an opportunity cost but one generally worth paying.
Threshold concepts are likely to be troublesome. Their reorganizing power brings with
it an unfamiliarity that sometimes proves acute and off-putting. You can’t rebalance
the boat without rocking it.
Id. at 13 (citations omitted).
171.

Webb, New Tool, supra note 86, at 10.

172. “[C]ognitive psychology suggests that metacognition, where students are aware of what
they are trying to accomplish, enables students to learn more effectively because their focus
is directed at the learning objective. Accordingly, educational practices have developed
that encourage teachers to ‘make learning goals explicit’ and coach students toward these
goals so that they can focus their efforts as learners.” Lori A. Roberts, Assessing Ourselves:
Confirming Assumptions and Improving Student Learning by Efficiently and Fearlessly
Assessing Student Learning Outcomes, 3 Drexel L. Rev. 457, 466–67 (2011).
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This premise has been demonstrated in a study by researchers at UC Santa
Barbara who, in a broader consideration of the goals and efficacy of general
education instruction,173 evaluated whether there were threshold concepts
that spanned across first-year writing courses and a history survey course.174
The researchers identified “ideas about interrelationships between audiences,
purposes, contexts, and genres”175 as threshold concepts common to both
composition and history courses and said that these “accrue across learning
contexts, such as those in History 17b and Writing 2, need to be reinforced
even more strongly in multiple classroom settings by students and instructors.”
The study concluded that
When these areas of shared concepts can be identified, it might then be
possible for instructors to explicitly articulate the concepts for themselves . . .
and work them explicitly into their teaching, perhaps in courses linked like
History 17b and Writing 2, or perhaps in other instructional configurations.
Then, working together, instructors can help students to explicitly, consciously
enact these shared threshold concepts, facilitating more effective transfer
across both.176
173. See Linda Adler-Kassner, John Majewski & Damian Koshnick, The Value of Troublesome
Knowledge: Transfer and Threshold Concepts in Writing and History, 26 Composition
Forum (Fall 2012), available at http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ985816.pdf. The study was
intended
to contribute to two, heated conversations that currently seem to operate parallel to
one another. One concerns the purpose of first-year writing courses, especially the ways
that they facilitate students’ abilities to transfer something—knowledge, strategies,
habits of mind—to other courses and contexts beyond the academy [and] . . . [t]he
second conversation . . . concerns the purpose and nature of general education (GE) in
the modern-day academy and focuses on what GE does and how it does those things.
Id. at 1.
174. See id. The researchers concluded that “threshold concepts may provide a productive frame
for faculty to productively engage with questions about the purposes of GE and to consider
how to support students as they work to achieve these purposes.” Id.
175. Id. at 3. The authors note, “[t]he troublesome knowledge inherent in these concepts means
that students need to engage in frequent practice with them across courses, rather than
focusing on them in discrete instances.” Id. at 13.
176. Id. at 15. The study’s conclusion should be viewed against the background of the initial
questions posed regarding the purpose of general education instruction. The study noted
that “[d]efining what a general education should do requires an enormous effort to build
consensus among faculty from across an institution.” Id. However, it is interesting to parallel
the study with this article’s emphasis on a discipline-specific threshold concept—in part
because there may be doctrine-specific threshold concepts where legal educators diverge
in terms of content-specific threshold concepts. To the extent that legal educators therefore
have additional layers of threshold complexity to consider, the study’s recognition of the
following is instructive:
Faculty necessarily and by definition work within the professional standards of their
disciplines, having worked long and hard to master their field’s threshold concepts,
enact those concepts, and sometimes contribute to the development and dissemination
of new concepts extending to new knowledge.
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Thus, assuming that there are discipline-specific threshold concepts that span
the first-year curriculum, including perhaps, malleability, some collaboration
between faculty in terms of explicit acknowledgment and coordinated
instruction should facilitate the “effective transfer” of these concepts.
Similarly, in evaluating whether threshold concepts exist in legal education,
Julien Webb acknowledged the need for their explicit acknowledgement
in curricular planning,177 and noted the following benefits of such explicit
instruction:
The explicit use of threshold concepts may thus help us achieve three
things. First, it may provide a counter-balance to the tendency to overload
the curriculum with substantive legal rules. This has often served to restrict
students’ learning to a ritualized use of formal knowledge, at the expense of
a deeper, more personalized, understanding of the law. Secondly, it may also
help us provide students with greater opportunities to acquire independence
in using legal concepts, since abstract knowledge is more likely to become
personalized and transformative through use. Thirdly, it follows that a focus
on threshold concepts also holds out perhaps greater potential for moving
students beyond their established ways of thinking and problem-solving.178

Finally, Wegner’s analysis of legal education reform supports the notion that
malleability as a threshold concept might be better introduced to students as
an explicit component of learning. She questions “‘should law students be
taught explicitly about the need to make their thinking processes more visible
and should more explicit attention be given to enhancing their capabilities
as thinkers through monitoring, diagnosing, and assessing what they know?
Might they prove to be more effective learners as a result?’”179
It is within this broader context, then, that we think the idea of focusing on threshold
concepts within and across general education courses holds particular potential as a new
perspective on considering the purposes and practices of general education courses.
Working from this perspective enables us to consider, as we have done here, whether
there are concepts that exist within specific disciplines, like composition and history,
that then can also span across disciplines. This perspective positions these concepts not
as all-purpose habits that exist within liberal learning, as in the distribution model,
but as discipline-specific concepts that operate within some number (two, in our case)
different contexts.
Id. (emphasis in original) Considering the above, it may be possible that there are doctrinespecific threshold concepts that operate across doctrinal areas but that are not as broadly
applicable as a discipline-specific threshold concept. I invite others to explore this possibility.
177.

Webb, New Tool, supra note 86, at 10. Webb states, “Critically, however, if Meyer and Land
are correct, it is these threshold concepts that are the core drivers for the core concepts and
discourses within a discipline, and things that must be made explicit to students if they are
to think effectively in the ways of that discipline.”

178. Id.
179. Wegner, supra note 165, at 939. While Wegner’s notion of thinking like a lawyer covers a
variety of skills, the issue of uncertainty about the law, or malleability of legal principles, is
part of her characterization of this discipline-specific reasoning process. She further queries
“If ‘thinking like a lawyer’ indeed serves as a metaphor for guiding students through areas
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Consider for example legal analysis and communication courses, in which
malleability is introduced and explored explicitly.180 Students are introduced
to the concept and helped to master it with opportunities to craft statements
of law more broadly or narrowly depending upon the objective of the
assignment181 and the interests of the client. Malleability may be examined more
implicitly in doctrinal courses, as students explore how the law develops over
time. In a Socratic exchange in a first-year doctrinal course, students typically
understand the process of posing hypotheticals as a constant modification of
the underlying facts and an emphasis on predicting the “right” result given
a static rule.182 This corresponds with Christopher Columbus Langdell’s
objective in introducing Socratic dialogue to the law school classroom.183 He
included this in an introduction to his contracts casebook:
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines. To
have such a mastery of these as to be able to apply them with constant facility
and certainty to the ever-tangled skein of human affairs, is what constitutes a
true lawyer; and hence to acquire that mastery should be the business of every
earnest student of law.184
of uncertainty as they begin to move forward on a professional path, are there other areas
of uncertainty that need to be identified and more directly addressed to fuel the learning
process and develop better lawyers as a result? If so, should these matters be addressed
during law school’s first year or at a later point?” Id. at 939–40.
180. See, e.g., Robin Wellford Slocum, Legal Reasoning, Writing, and Other Lawyering Skills
130–34 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., 3d. ed. 2011) (noting that “[t]he ambiguous nature of
courts’ holdings will provide [the student] with a fair degree of latitude to express holdings
broadly or narrowly, depending on which rule statements most effectively support your
clients’ interests”).
181. Most first-year courses address predictive analysis first, and then proceed to persuasive
analysis. As noted in section II(B) supra, the analytical process, including the formulation
of rules and synthesis of prior authority, may differ depending upon the objective of the
analysis.
182. See, e.g., Stephen Wizner, The Law School Clinic: Legal Education in the Interests of Justice,
70 Fordham L. Rev. 1929, 1931 (2002) (“The Socratic [M]ethod also included a critical
analysis of the arguments and conclusions contained in the case reports, often through
hypothetical variations of the facts in the cases.”).
183. See Peggy Cooper Davis & Elizabeth Ehrenfest Steinglass, A Dialogue About Socratic
Teaching, 23 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 249, 261–64 (1997). The authors note, “Like
Socrates, Langdell used questions to provoke critical thinking. But unlike Socrates, Langdell
seemed to believe that he knew, and his students could be expected to discover, the truth of
the matters being considered.” Id. at 262 (citations omitted).
184. Id. (citing Christopher C. Langdell, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts viii
(2d ed. 1879)). The authors note that “[f]rom his theories of law and legal education, we
infer that when Langdell posed questions about cases, he expected students’ answers to
reference the ‘correct’ underlying doctrine.” Id. See also Adam Neufeld, Costs of an Outdated
Pedagogy? Study on Gender at Harvard Law School, 13 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L.
511, 520 (2005) (noting that “legal realists and others have argued that the standard pedagogy
exaggerates the determinacy of law”).
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To be fair, this unlikely is the approach taken in most Socratic classrooms, and
instructors probably do explore the limits of the rule, or the malleability of the
law, in their questioning.185 In fact, in a contemporary Socratic classroom, the
following may occur:
The professor may want to focus on how the facts and context of [a client’s]
situation test the contours and legitimacy of the rule. If she does this, she is
likely to want the discussion to reveal relationships between the identified
function of a rule and its interpretation; she is also likely to want to discuss
ways in which case facts suggest a rule’s functions and test its efficacy. Of
course, she may also want to have a broader discussion of the functions,
wisdom and efficacy of the rule, in which case the discussion will turn to
policy analysis.186

Such an “approach to case analysis acknowledges indeterminacy,”187 or
malleability. However, it is unclear that the concept is made explicit to students
in the Socratic exchange, and, perhaps more importantly, it is unclear that
students who are not actively engaged in the Socratic dialogue understand
malleability as a critical component of legal reasoning.188
If malleability is indeed a threshold concept, students might be better
served if the concept was acknowledged explicitly in all first year courses,
including those in which it is likely to be an implicit concept. So, for example,
in doctrinal courses, instructors could reinforce during the Socratic dialogue
that the law can be stated at differing levels of abstraction to modify the
analysis.189 Student understanding might be further facilitated not only by
185. Davis & Steinglass, supra, note 183, at 268.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. “By the end of her dialogue, [the Professor] has used a variety of techniques with the
potential to engage many students at many levels. But inevitably, many of [the Professor’s]
students have not participated in the dialogue; some, overwhelmed by the relief that they
were not the one called on, have not even listened attentively.” Id. at 275. Michael Hunter
Schwartz describes the failing of the Socratic Method in terms of feedback coverage across
the classroom:
Law schools fall far short of the goal of providing adequate practice and feedback.
Practice opportunities implicitly exist every time a professor calls on any student;
the other students can attempt to answer the professor’s questions in their minds.
Professors do not require students to do so. Moreover, only the selected student
actually receives feedback, and the feedback often indicates only that the student has
erred without helping the student discern the nature of the error or how to correct it.
Students, as noted at the outset of this Article, are expected to learn from that feedback
vicariously. Of course, even assuming the watching students are playing along, they
may have committed different errors than the selected students.
Michael Hunter Schwartz, Teaching Law by Design: How Learning Theory and
Instructional Design Can Inform and Reform Law Teaching, 38 San Diego L. Rev. 347,
416–17 (2001).
189. See, e.g., Wegner, supra note 165, at 939 (2009). Wegner explains that law faculty members
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making the concept explicit, but also by first year instructors’ consistent
and deliberate focus on the concept. Such consistency across the first year
of instruction should begin with nomenclature190 and, ideally, also implicate
consistently sequenced instruction and assessment.191
For example, if instructors were to collaborate and jointly acknowledge
malleability as a threshold concept within their teaching for first-years,
faculty might identify additional core concepts, or learning activities to better
help students master these. Malleability also could be viewed as a portal to
understanding case synthesis, which could serve as a portal to understanding
how to process information in a disciplinary-specific manner, or how to think
like a lawyer. In this way, malleability would become a threshold concept
across the curriculum and curricular sequencing and formative assessments
could be crafted by faculty to help students advance through these portals.
As noted, assessments might vary somewhat from course to course to take
into account course-specific goals, such as the communication of underlying
doctrine. However, a collaborative effort to use similar nomenclature and
assessments to reinforce what other courses address likely would benefit
student understanding. In addition to assessment, instructors could
may not “fully appreciate the importance of legal writing courses in bolstering students’
analytical strengths, providing them with an important context in which to learn from
experience, engaging them in solving poorly defined problems, [and] exposing them to
the art forms and acts required of lawyers in practice . . . .” Because “legal education has
not really embraced the need for students to learn to ‘do and act’ or appreciated the ways in
which ‘doing and acting’ are powerful means to fuel learning of substance itself,” instructors
may not recognize how an explicit acknowledgement of malleability as a threshold concept
in a first year doctrinal course improves student understanding.
190. See id. at 936. Wegner emphasizes that “‘[t]hinking like a lawyer’ involves an array of
sophisticated intellectual tasks that are generally not named or described explicitly, but
which correspond to widely-recognized cognitive tasks associated with higher-order
thinking often familiar to those students with strong earlier academic preparation and
less well-known to others with more non-traditional backgrounds.” Id. However, “Law
schools have historically been weak in articulating their institutional goals, recognizing and
confronting comprehensive educational challenges facing their students, and committing
to ongoing assessment of the effectiveness of their instructional programs.” Id. at 941. She
questions whether “naming and addressing these issues [would] make a difference in student
performance?” Id. at 936.
191. See id. at 938. Wegner observes that “Bloom’s taxonomy, as embodied in the ‘case-dialogue
method’ of teaching, assumes a type of progression from less to more complex educational
objectives, with each level building on the one that precedes it and moving toward another
requiring greater sophistication of thought.” She then poses some related questions:
Might law faculty give further consideration to structuring some aspects of instruction
with this notion of progression in mind? . . . Do students’ cognitive abilities develop
in stages, as is the case with craft apprentices’ skills? If so, how might law teachers
cement a sense of mastery step by step, build effectively on prior learning and develop
increasing sophistication over time through movement toward more diverse and
complex problems? Would more attention to sequencing educational tasks prove
useful, and what would it entail?
Id. A focus on threshold concepts theory might inform the answers to these questions.
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collaborate to identify appropriate levels of competence or benchmarks for
student understanding of this concept.192 These benchmarks would set a
foundational level for understanding this aspect of legal reasoning that could
then be enhanced (and acknowledged) in upper-level instruction.193
In addition, as a teaching tool for understanding technique, identifying
threshold concepts helps educators select and organize material. Focusing
content on these concepts helps educators avoid the “stuffed curriculum,”194
and streamline content to enhance learning toward the core educational goals
of the course of instruction.195 A high volume of content in a course may “be
more about what the teacher wants to include, rather than what the student
needs to know to become a successful graduate.”196 In contrast, students must,
by definition, master threshold concepts to join the disciplinary community.
The identification of a discipline-specific threshold concept such as malleability,
192. See generally Victoria L. VanZandt, Creating Assessment Plans for Introductory Legal Research
and Writing Courses, 16 Legal Writing: J. Legal Writing Inst. 313 (2010). VanZandt explains
the process of assessment of student learning in legal education, emphasizing that student
learning outcomes should be developed by consensus. “Collaboration is used here in the
broadest sense, meaning discussion, dialogue, and consultation with various individuals,
institutions, and materials to aid in the creation of learning outcomes. The query is simple:
‘what [do] new lawyers need to know, understand, and be able to do when they begin
practice?’” Id. at 325. Assuming that faculty can agree that students need to understand
malleability in order to think and practice as a lawyer, assessment planning suggests that
faculty should then adopt performance criteria, or benchmarks of competence, to assess
student learning. See id. at 332–33. Doing so across the curriculum, as suggested here, should
enhance student learning. Focusing on learning outcomes in a legal research and writing
course, VanZandt explains how the development of criteria for student performance in that
course informs instruction in other courses. “The use of performance criteria will inform
other faculty of what skills have been introduced and what level of competency is to be
obtained in those skills in an introductory LRW course.” Id. at 332.
193. See, e.g., Wegner, supra note 165, at 939. The author observes that “[i]nstruction in the forms
of legal reasoning associated with ‘thinking like a lawyer’ is largely unbounded, that is, there
is no real sense that a particular discernible level of mastery is to be developed by the end
of the first year. Could meaningful benchmarks be set for determining when sufficient time
has been spent on this endeavor and students have achieved an acceptable level of basic
mastery, so that additional educational goals might be embraced more explicitly beyond the
first year?” Id.
194. See, e.g., Cousin, Introduction, supra note 4, at 4. Educators have a “tendency . . . to stuff their
curriculum with content, burdening themselves with the task of transmitting vast amounts
of knowledge bulk and their students of absorbing and reproducing this bulk.” Id. An
identification of “threshold concepts enables teachers to make refined decisions about what
is fundamental to a grasp of the subject they are teaching. It is a ‘less is more’ approach to
curriculum design.” Id.
195. See Webb, New Tool, supra note 86, at 10 (stressing that the explicit use of threshold concepts
“provide[s] a counter-balance to the tendency to overload the curriculum with substantive
legal rules”).
196. See Barradell, supra note 7, at 268. Barradell cautions that “[a] high volume of content has
the potential to encourage students to adopt a superficial approach to learning,” but that
“[t]hreshold concepts offer a way to streamline what is taught in a way that is valuable to
both teachers and learners.” Id.
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which is ideally explored in the first year, might assist educators in tightly
focusing on which materials best help students.
Instructors also could work together to develop exercises to apply and to
reinforce both underlying legal doctrine and the concept of malleability. In
legal writing, for example, students often must perform synthesis exercises,
reading a series of cases to develop an overarching rule that can be mapped
back across them. A component of this exercise is its explicit acknowledgment
of how broadly or narrowly a rule reasonably may be construed to comport
with prior cases. Similar exercises could be developed for other doctrinal
courses. This type of exercise also ensures that student understanding is
broadly assessed. But it is the identification of the threshold concept and
the collaborative effort by the faculty to identify the places in the curriculum
where students struggle that should help to inform more consistent pedagogy
across the first-year of study.
In sum, because threshold concepts point out spots in the curriculum where
students struggle, they can help educators assess their methods and coreconcept instruction to help students. 197 Identification of threshold concepts
may reveal why some students do not even see the portal, why some remain on
the doorstep, and why some get caught in a liminal state. Threshold concepts
also may be mapped across the curriculum,198 and educators can determine
where to position not only the next logical portal but also how to position
core-concept instruction to lead the way. Finally, threshold concepts have been
characterized as “jewels in the curriculum.”199 As such, they “can be used to
define potentially powerful transformative points in the student’s learning
experience.”200
197. See Land et al., Implications, supra note 6, at 62–63. The authors explain that
[t]he task for course developers and designers here is to identify, through constructive
(and constructivist) feedback, the source of these epistemological barriers, and
subsequently to free up the blocked spaces by, for example, redesigning activities
and sequences, through scaffolding, through provision of support materials and
technologies or new conceptual tools, through mentoring or peer collaboration,
to provide the necessary shift in perspective that might permit further personal
development.
Id.
198. See Barradell, supra note 7, at 268. Barradell explains that mapping curricular content includes
“identifying transformative and troublesome aspects of curricula, recognizing the importance
of integrating concepts vertically and horizontally and within prior knowledge constructs,
considering what concepts need to precede and integrate others, and being aware of unique
disciplinary ways of thinking and practising that will shape the curriculum.” Id. (emphasis
in original).
199. Land et al., Implications, supra note 6, at 57.
200. Id. The authors explain that threshold concepts “can serve to identify crucial points in the
framework of engagement that teachers may wish to construct [and they] . . . may also serve
a helpful diagnostic purpose.” Id.
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III. Conclusion
Identifying threshold concepts is not easy201 and there may be disagreement
about what these transformative jewels in the curriculum truly are. Moreover,
the identification of threshold concepts may be more straightforward in some
disciplines as opposed to others.202
In addition to the difficulty of identifying threshold concepts, this is a
relatively new and developing area of inquiry. So the question arises: Does
threshold concepts theory explain “empirical observations, or is it a concept
incorporating and representing several abstract ideas?”203 Moreover, because
much of the work on them has not been tested empirically, “[t]hreshold
concepts carry not only theoretical complexity but also methodological
challenges.”204
Still, “the intent behind threshold concepts is to improve the learning
experience of students. Inextricably linked to this is the teaching of students. . . .
Remembering why we want to identify threshold concepts in the first place
ultimately helps the process.”205 And, just as important, “[t]heories are just
ideas after all. But if an idea is a threshold concept, it can give us the possibility
of a future. If it becomes a capability, that future becomes more reachable.”206
The threshold concepts inquiry is therefore engaging for educators, and holds
201. See Barradell, supra note 7, at 269 (noting that “[i]dentifying threshold concepts is not an easy
task. Atherton et al. (2008) even go so far as to say ‘that the idea of a threshold concept is in
itself a threshold concept’”).
202. See Meyer & Land, Linkages, supra note 8, at 12. The authors observe that:
Threshold concepts would seem to be more readily identified within disciplinary
contexts where there is a relatively greater degree of consensus on what constitutes a
body of knowledge (for example, Mathematics, Physics, Medicine). However within
areas where there is not such a clearly identified body of knowledge it might still be
the case that what the ETL project team have come to encapsulate in the term ways
of thinking and practising also constitutes a crucial threshold function in leading to a
transformed understanding.
Id. (citations omitted).
203. Walker, supra note 13, at 250.
204. Barradell, supra note 7, at 274. See also Ursula Lucas & Rosina Mladenovic, Potential of
Threshold Concepts as a Research Field, 5 London Review of Education, No. 3, 237 (2007).
In the article, the authors assert:
This raises a central question that is frequently asked about threshold concepts: to
what extent does it comprise a field that will develop its own theoretical framework?
It may be, however, that rather than representing a field in its own right, it may act as
a catalyst, drawing together fields of research in a productive educative framework.
Id. at 245.
205. Barradell, supra note 7, at 269 (observing that “[t]his should be remembered during any
conversation on threshold concepts, and the starting point should be the identification of
these concepts—for if we cannot appropriately identify them, their subsequent use is limited
in value”).
206. Baillie et al., Knowledge Capability, supra note 22, at 244.
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great promise for student learning. “It has helped to redesign curricula with
critical, transformational yet troublesome subject content in mind.”207
Therefore, considering threshold concepts within legal education—as a
theory or as an idea—has potential benefits so we teachers may understand
why and where students struggle. The process may also inform pedagogy and
curricular development to further student understanding.

207. Id. (noting that the “Threshold Concept Framework is a powerful one that has literally swept
the world, across many different disciplines”).

